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18 March 1977

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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL, AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
No. 1366

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CONTENTS

PAGE

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

- Romanians Hail Polish Book on Romanian Hero
(Gheorghe Duzinchevici; LUCEAFARUL, 25 Dec 76) 1

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- 'RUDE PRAVO' Accuses West of Interference on Human Rights
(Dusan Rovensky; RUDE PRAVO, 15 Feb 77) 6

- 'RUDE PRAVO' Attacks London 'TIMES' for Human Rights
Reporting
(Jiri Plumlovsky; RUDE PRAVO, 16 Feb 77) 8

- CSSR State Police Officers Evaluate Their Organization in
Interview
(TRIBUNA, 29 Dec 76) 11

EAST GERMANY

- GDR Military Developments Reported
(DIE WELT, various dates) 16

Figures on Military Expenditures
GDR Military Involvement in Africa, by Heinz Vielain

- Structure, Staffing of Bezirk Councils Analyzed
(INFORMATIONEN, Dec 76) 19

- Importance of Bezirk Plant Newspapers Emphasized
(BERLINER ZEITUNG, 3 Feb 77) 23

- New Vocational Training System Described
(INFORMATIONEN, No 2, 1977) 25

CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

POLAND

Importance of Democracy, Discipline in Socialism Stressed (Lech Winiarski; ZA WOLNOSC I LUD, 15 Jan 77)	27
Lack of Legal Information Available to Citizens Scored (Stanislaw Podemski; POLITYKA, 12 Feb 77)	31
History Teaching in Reformed System Debated (Various sources, various dates)	36
Conference Report, by Teresa Pioro Place of History Discussed, by Katarzyna Z. Kolodziejczyk	

ROMANIA

'STEUAU' Literary Review Compares Formalism, Formulism (Eugen Uricaru; STEUAU, Dec 76)	47
---	----

YUGOSLAVIA

Kardelj Discusses Communist Party's Policy During Uprising (Edvard Kardelj; TANJUG, 23-25 Feb 77)	51
--	----

ROMANIANS HAIL POLISH BOOK ON ROMANIAN HERO

Bucharest LUCEAFARUL in Romanian 25 Dec 76 p 8

[Review by Gheorghe Duzinchevici of the book "Michal Waleczny" (Michael The Brave) by Danuta Bienkowska, Wydawnictwo "Slask" ("Silesia" Publishing House), Katowice, 1975, 191 pages plus 12 pages of illustrations]

[Text] Danuta Bienkowska's work, having appeared under excellent professional conditions, is impressive to even the most exacting reader. The author knows Romanian well and uses a rich bibliography for her story, without transforming the book into a work of history. She uses a minimum amount of data, including dates, in fixing the points in time of the interesting details in her story. The author is an admirer of Michael The Brave. He is "a hero of orthodoxy (...) a forerunner of the unification of the Romanian nations, a hope of liberty in the Balkan Peninsula, successor of the Greek traditions of Byzantium" (p 16). She describes him in Sadeler's woodcut: "He took like a stern man, with wicked eyes, with bushy eyebrows, with a big nose, with a black beard, and with narrow lips" (p 16).

With great skill, so the Polish readers can more easily understand the actions taking place, the author presents a number of clarifications regarding the Turkish power fully pursuing expansionist policies after the fall of Constantinople in 1453, as well as the situation in Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia, considering the threat posed by the power in southeast Europe. In this historical background, she could not but touch upon--in order to show the newness of Michael's reign--the struggle between the different pretenders to the throne of Moldavia or the throne of Wallachia. This was a struggle that proved to be most damaging to the people who had to supply the monetary loans to these pretenders, who were under contract to Constantinople, and who, as it turned out, enriched these temporary rulers who passed through the two Romanian principalities.

In the chapter "Auction for Power," she identifies those people in Constantinople who helped Michael obtain the throne: Sigismund Bathory, the prince of Transylvania, who recommended him to Sinan Pasa; Iane; and

through the Greeks in Constantinople "who wanted to have their man on the throne of Wallachia during this time when the Christians living in Transylvania, as well as the other subjugated nations, once again had aspirations for liberty" (p 34). Andronic Cantacuzino was nother supporter. In a beautiful translation, the author reproduces Cantacuzino's letters addressed to Petre the Lame, especially the passage in which he speaks of the help he gave to Michael in attaining the throne of Wallachia (ibid.).

Michael's adherence to the Anti-Ottoman League was spontaneous. The author succeeds in presenting a good summary describing this political-military organization, pointing out the weaknesses of the Habsburgs in their pursuit of glory. Sigismund Bathory is characterized well: "a man with a changing character, ambitious and cowardly" (p 47). It should be remembered that Poland, removed from the Turkish threat, did not have the same goals as the League. Further, the Polish gentry viewed the Habsburgs as an enemy. The Polish chancellor, Jan Zamoyski, "was afraid of the Habsburgs' extending their influence over the Danubian principalities," which he wanted to keep allied as close as possible to Poland. He himself wanted to become the prince of Transylvania (p 38). Knowing this, we can understand why Zamoyski was Michael's enemy when Michael approached the Habsburgs, having been forced in their direction by Sigismund's attitude (p 64).

Remarkable for the clarity of its explanations and the serious nature of its information is the chapter in which she points out how Michael, through the bloody actions of 13 November 1594 against the foreign creditors, began the struggle against the Turks. The author skillfully presents us with the Turkish political undercurrents after the death of Sultan Murad III which brought back Sinan Pasa as the Grand Vizier. Michael's victorious struggle for the line along the Danube proved to the people living south of the Danube, who had also been under Turkish rule, that the Turks could be defeated and, as a result, swelled the ranks of Michael's troops with Albanian, Serbian and Bulgarian volunteers.

The replacement of Aron Voda of Moldavia, in whom Sigismund no longer had faith, with Razvan, did not suit Michael. And when this same prince of Transylvania, by virtue of the treaty of 20 May 1595 concluded at Alba Iulia with the Wallachian delegation, transformed the ruler of the land into one of his deputies, with all of the obstacles stemming from this situation, Michael, on the spot, while continuing to maintain good relations with him, in secret became an ally of Emperor Rudolf and Chancellor Zamoyski of Poland. Later, in July 1595, Zamoyski sent his messenger Lubienecki to see Michael. The Muntenian ruler asked him to tell the Polish king "that neither the Emperor Rudolf nor Sigismund could be counted on." In his final meeting with the Polish messenger, Michael noted that the Poles should be careful with the Tartars and stop their advance toward Wallachia. This was on the eve of the beginning of the struggle against the Turks.

After a short chapter devoted to the battle at Calugareni, in which the courage of the Christian soldiers led by Michael appears in all its greatness, the author follows with a chapter in which she shows how the unification of the two churches, the Catholic and the Orthodox, happened to occur on Polish Territory (Brzesc, 23 December 1595). This was an event which, in addition to its religious significance, had another effect: the creation of a powerful base from which to attain the political unity of a state in which the Polish and Ruthenian languages were used.

After the battle at Calugareni, there followed the occupation of Wallachia by Sinan's troops. The counteroffensive of the Muntenian soldiers and those from Transylvania, led by Sigismund, is nicely presented by the author. The author emphasizes, however, that in this action Michael played the key role and not Sigismund, since the Turkish historian Naima does not speak of Sigismund but places credit for the Turk's defeat upon "the traitor, the evil" Michael; or, the "infamous Michael came out of the woods," conquered Tirgoviste and Giurgiu where "the enemy hit like turbined pigs, destroying the bridge and drowning the Moslems." The author goes on to quote from Naima's chronicle: "In our history, there was never such a catastrophic retreat." In order to show Sigismund's true part, the author proceeds to write: "Sigismund Bathory, not taking advantage of the victory, went back to Transylvania as fast as possible. As payment to Michael, he renounced the most demeaning point in the treaty (the treaty of 20 May 1595) regarding his rights to control the income of his lands. However, this magnanimous gesture did not cost him much: Wallachia was seriously damaged by the campaign, the population had fled in part and robbed on the other, food reserves were lost, and commerce was not even spoken of." The author anxiously continues to reestablish the historical truth: "Sigismund's return from Giurgiu was motivated, officially, by the fact that because of the lack of pasture lands he was losing many horses. The truth is, however, that the Transylvanian nobles did not want to stray too far from their homes and that they would have been happier to conclude an armistice with the Turks..." (p 94). After he had returned from the fortress at Erlau, where, together with the imperial troops he had fought with the Turks, Sigismund called for Michael to come to him. Prior to Christmas 1596, Sigismund was at Alba Iulia. So low was Sigismund's prestige, that the chancellor of Transylvania, Josika, who was of Romanian origin, advised the ruler of Wallachia in secret to make an effort to perhaps obtain the throne of Transylvania" (p 100).

The author then covers the history of the years 1596-1599, regarding: the diplomatic activities of Transylvania where a man as unreliable as Sigismund who, as noted above, "had neither the military talent nor the courage necessary to fight the Turks" (p 103) nonetheless ruled this principality and had a great role within the framework of the Anti-Ottoman League; the diplomatic activities of Wallachia where Michael used foreigners in some leadership positions, although these foreigners--for example Petru Grigorovici (the author gives some interesting details regarding this man) --did not always report back to him the exact result of their missions, and

where Michael had problems (pp 110-111); the diplomatic activities of Poland, ably led by Chancellor Zamoyski, who brought about the Ottoman's recognition of Ieremia Movila as the ruler of Moldavia even though he was placed there by the military intervention of Poland, and the rule of his rightful son; the disagreement between Ieremia Movila and the Polish representative to the Ottoman Empire, Jan Szczesny Herburt, in which the ruler of Moldavia comes across as a firm and dignified man (pp 121-125); Michael's treaties with the empires and the results of these treaties, and so forth; Michael's battles with the Turks at Nicopol, Vidin, Isaccea (pp 117-119); the plot of the Greek landowners against Michael (p 106). All of the above points, based on documents in Polish archives and presented to make the story more convincing, once again prove the author's great care in writing this account as well as the level of her preparation in handling this subject.

The last chapters of the book dedicated to Michael the Brave deal with the unification of Transylvania and Moldavia; with all the internal and external complications arising from this unexpected event; with the attitude of the Poles, Turks and empires toward the great power that was being born in southeast Europe; Michael's temporary fall from power; and his last resurgence to recover Transylvania where, after victory, he is wickedly assassinated. All these pages of the epic are written in a style that is captivating. With her literary skill in this final chapter, the author carefully introduces in her story a number of documents, or pieces of documents, to convince the reader. Danuta Bienkowska--here again is one of her great qualities--does not introduce mechanically or chronologically data that she has taken out of books and documents. She weighs potentially informative material well and presents her own opinion, reinforcing it by using the comparative method. Here is how she appraises the unification of the three Romanian nations: "Neither in Prague nor in Warsaw did they understand why Michael was in such a hurry, why he constantly looked for allies, (or why) he embraced new political concepts. Evidently for Rudolf II and (the Polish king) Sigismund III, the problem of Transylvania, and even of all three Danubian principalities together, was of lesser importance than the inheritance of the throne, the understandings with other powers, or court intrigue. For Michael, however, nothing was more important than the Danubian questions. For the first time since its entry in the historical arena, he had the chance to formulate that which, up until then, had only been felt or not expressed clearly. The unification of all the lands inhabited by a population which spoke Romanian ceased to be exclusively a question of its tactics, and (unification) became an idea. This can be seen both in his words and in his administrative initiatives and his efforts to strengthen everything Romanian. His contemporaries did not succeed in appreciating or even understanding this point. If he had been given the opportunity to rule longer, the results of his policies would have been more evident and more convincing" (p 152).

In order to show the response to the military achievements of Michael the Brave in Europe, the author quotes what Henri IV, King of France, wrote:

"We are told that the Romanian is very powerful and (that) his plans grow in proportion to his victories"; and she reproduces the following phrase from a publication that appeared in Rome: "If ever there was a prince who, for his miraculous deeds, deserves to be called a hero, it is the Romanian prince, Michael."

Danuta Bienkowska's work makes known to the Polish readers, in a most attractive form and with good documentation, the personality which grew out of a common background, of Michael the Brave, as well as his shining military deeds.

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CSO: 2700

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

'RUDE PRAVO' ACCUSES WEST OF INTERFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 15 Feb 77 p 7

[Article by Dusan Rovensky: "Anticommunists and 'Human Rights'"]

[Text] Inspired by anticommunist centrals the mass media in capitalist countries have in recent months unleashed one of the largest and most malicious campaigns against the socialist community in recent years. The anti-communist centrals receive food for this campaign, which is planned, coordinated and financed by the West, from insignificant groups of renegades, political adventurers and traitors who are without any influence in socialist countries and represent nobody.

The main thrust of the anticommunist centrals' campaign constitute lies about the alleged violation of human rights in socialist states. These lies are designed to obscure the reality that in capitalist states human rights are being trampled on shamelessly and on a mass scale while in contrast the socialist states guarantee the full development and implementation of human rights because their social system knows no exploitation of one man by another.

The anticommunist crusade is designed to obscure the reality that there is no true democracy in the capitalist world, to discredit socialism, to weaken the international prestige of the socialist community, to disorient and divide the progressive social forces in the West and create an unfavorable atmosphere for the upcoming Belgrade conference of the signatory countries of the Final Act. At the same time the campaign constitutes a gross interference in the internal affairs of socialist countries and if there are any capitalist states which on 1 August 1975 signed in Helsinki the Final Act participating in this campaign, it is also a violation of this important international document.

In the Final Act, signatory countries have agreed to abstain from any direct or indirect, individual or collective interference in affairs whose solution is the sovereign business of other states. In violation of this pledge not only the press but even government representatives of many capitalist states

have attempted to interfere in the internal affairs of socialist states and to this end even used pamphlets and slander which are the work of political adventurers and wrecks.

This, therefore, represents interference of the worst kind. It proves again that the reactionary forces of the West and media inspired by them are bent on preventing a relaxation of tensions and on turning the European continent back to the times of the cold war. The anticommunist centrals of the West are pursuing concrete political goals. For example, they want to divert attention from the fact that Britain stands accused before the International Court in Strassburg of torture of political prisoners by its soldiers and policemen, that the racist South African authorities have massacred hundreds of people, that patriots are being jailed in Chilean concentration camps and that there are reactionary regimes in a number of capitalist states which trample on basic human rights. The objective of these "fighters for human rights" is to cover up the truth about capitalism and to slander socialism.

Actually, anticommunist centrals aided by capitalist governments organized campaigns and actions against the spirit and letter of the Final Act from the very first day after Helsinki. On 2 August 1975, or already on the second day after the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Committee for Friendship and Aid for Democratic Socialism in Portugal inspired by the Socialist International met in Stockholm. It dealt with interference into the progressive development of the revolution. The same was repeated in Italy where the United States spared no expense in its support of the extreme reactionary forces. The American ambassador in Rome even interfered to such extent that one of the first steps of the Carter government was finding a new man for Rome.

But attempts of gross interference have been and are aimed primarily against socialist countries. The progressive West Berlin bulletin EXTRADIENST characterized it in this way: "Imperialist strategy requires constant turmoil.... It needs to produce manifestos and proclamations addressed to the West, it needs 'martyrs'.... This purpose is also being served by anticommunist campaigns be they directed against Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, the GDR or against other socialist countries."

Anticommunist campaigns are proof of the weakness of capitalism, a reflection of the intensifying crises, conflicts and defeats of capitalism, an expression of its hopelessness.

Socialism proves that only a social system which has abolished exploitation of one man by another, removed class contradictions and insured the full development of the human personality, only a society striving to prevent war and working for a lasting peace is able to insure full implementation of human rights.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

'RUDE PRAVO' ATTACKS LONDON 'TIMES' FOR HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 16 Feb 77 p 6

[Article by Jiri Plumlovsky: "Horrible, Fantastic, Unbelievable"]

[Text] The traditional anti-Czechoslovak and generally anticommunist bias of the London newspaper the TIMES is publicly known. Therefore, nobody was surprised when this very paper was among the first to actively join in the anti-Czechoslovak hysteria in connection with the slanderous pamphlet, the so-called Charter 77. And it did so with real verve and authority. How else, when we consider the once perhaps generally recognized "trustworthiness" of this venerable British daily.

This time the TIMES, with its official and unofficial reporters, public and confidential correspondents and informers almost everywhere in the world, obviously did not dare to send its special correspondent into our country, aware of the questionable reputation the paper due to its active share in various anti-Czechoslovak campaigns is enjoying. But already at the inception of the well-planned "big action" with a group of Czechoslovak renegades and pretenders its readers received detailed information about the wrongs done to some people in Czechoslovakia in well informed articles and news stories about the dramatic telephone conversations on its Bonn reporter with leading Czechoslovak dissidents. About how their human rights, their freedom and even their bare human existence are being curtailed. From a distance of several hundred kilometers, the TIMES correspondent in Bonn worked with such insight that he was able to describe in living color, for example, his telephone conversation with Pavel Kohout at the very moment when the cruel Czechoslovak security agents were forcibly breaking into his apartment. But somehow, as if by oversight, he failed to explain to his readers how it was possible for this one-time leading representative of the young socialist culture with "a blue shirt and a red heart", deprived of all human rights, to calmly grant interviews from his apartment to callers from foreign countries and meet freely with other reporters who, chasing after sensations, made the trip to Prague, and send communications and messages by various means to kindred souls abroad. Given the context and purpose, this is probably of little importance in the opinion of the paper's editor.

The important thing is to divert the attention of the British reader who has to face daily the consequences of a severe economic crisis, inflation, unemployment, and social insecurity. Of course, it is regrettable, to say the least, when as the result of the false road which the TIMES newspaper and other media have taken, even government representatives allow themselves to be carried away to make illconsidered pronouncements. Because otherwise they would have their hands full and had to worry about securing basic human rights and a secure life for the citizens of their own country.

It is remarkable how British opinion about Czechoslovakia changes. The older and middle-aged generation of readers will certainly remember the declaration by the infamous British Prime Minister N. Chamberlain who, following his return from the signing of the Munich agreement which spelled the destruction of Czechoslovakia, who in his enthusiasm over his negotiations with Hitler which he expected would lead to "peace in our time" said verbatim: "How horrible, fantastic, unbelievable that we should have to dig trenches and try on gas masks because of some dispute in a faraway country between peoples about whom we know nothing."

This declaration, which the majority of honest British contemporaries is ashamed of to this day, the TIMES presented to its readers without batting an eye. It was in full agreement with the paper's policy because already 6 months-before, in an editorial dated 22 March 1938, the always well-informed TIMES wrote that Great Britain could not go to war to save Czechoslovak sovereignty from the Sudeten Germans without first clarifying the wishes of the latter. If it did otherwise Britain "could easily fight against the principle of self-determination."

In this case, history is being exceptionally repeated. Just as almost 40 years ago, the TIMES is interested only in the wishes and interests of a small group of people striving then as today for unrest, dissension and finally the destruction of the republic. Today just as then, the TIMES is quite uninterested in the views of millions of Czechoslovak citizens.

This is also quite evident from an editorial published in this paper in recent days. Aside from the gross distortion of reality and the insolent attacks on our representatives which in every civilized country are in direct conflict not only with ethical reporting but also with basic human decency, it also contains "well meant" advice to the Czechoslovak government. The venerable editorialist of the TIMES condenscendingly recommends to the Czechoslovak government to work toward enabling its people to live a normal civilized life "...if it wishes that its country be considered part of Europe in 1977."

Truly, an exceptional insolence. But again nothing new. Even attempts to erase Czechoslovakia from the map of Europe have been made before. How they ended up is well-known. And our views about a "normal civilized life" are obviously diametrically opposed. But we have nothing to regret.

As long as a normal civilized life means half a million unemployed, a steadily decreasing standard of living, fear of disease and old age, hundreds of thousands living in various hovels or even without a roof above their heads, as long as constant terror, bloodshed and daily violence and the flouting of human rights accompany such life as in the case of Northern Ireland, then we sincerely wish this remarkably "normal and civilized" life on our "counsellor and friend", the editorialist of the TIMES. But we would rather he or the likes of him stopped meddling into our life and our socialist reality.

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CSO: 2400

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CSSR STATE POLICE OFFICERS EVALUATE THEIR ORGANIZATION IN INTERVIEW

Prague TRIBUNA in Czech No 53, 29 Dec 76 pp 4, 5

[Text] Our country is beautiful. People, their work, their day to day lives, their love and faithfulness to the country of their birth make it more beautiful each year. All of this would have no value if our citizens could not build their homeland in peace, comfort and happiness. The members of the National Security Corps [SNB], often without our realizing it, are also responsible for this. Many of them died or lost their health in the line of their difficult duty. We will talk about some of them in the series called "Unusual Days in an Ordinary Life" which will be published in TRIBUNA starting in January 1977. Our interview today, which we prepared for TRIBUNA readers with the help of Comrade Colonel Jan Kovar, chief of the Press Department of the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Lieutenant Colonel Dr Vlastislav Kroupa, chairman of the Department of SNB History, will lead the way.

[Question] It is not accidental that during the 1968-1969 years of crisis the National Security Corps [SNB] became the object of vicious attacks by reactionary, counterrevolutionary factions. Even our archives contain an endless amount of documentation about this unfortunate period of time. LITERARNI LISTY in one of its articles of 16 May 1968 wrote among other things "Various reports exposing the present acts of State Security indicate that we are dealing with the largest illegal organization in our history. Its liquidation should be carried out publicly". However, the SNB was in a similar situation once before, was it not?

[Answer] Colonel Jan Kovar: "Yes, and that was during the years 1945-1948 when enemies of the people's democratic establishment managed to get high positions in non-communist parties in the National Front and attacked the SNB in a vicious manner. Twenty years later we were witnesses to most vicious attacks against the SNB and the Ministry of Interior mounted by new forces had joined the old reactionary ones, which had been stripped of political and

economic power and their comfortable life by February; these new forces were the rightist opportunists whose actions and conspiracy against the SNB were especially dangerous because they even misused the party to help them achieve their own objectives."

[Question] There cannot be even the slightest doubt about the ideological relationship concerning class and policy line between the counterrevolutionary forces of the pre-February coup and those of the anti-socialist and rightist opportunist group of the sixties. It is also quite evident today that these forces, even though at different times, used attacks against the security systems as one of the means toward bringing about a change in the power structure of the state.

[Answer] Lt Col Dr Vlastislav Kroupa: "In both cases through systematic slander, by accusations of committing unlawful actions and by preparing provocations, the SNB was to have been discredited to the extent that workers would lose confidence in it; its authority and social position was supposed to be damaged in order that it would not be able to fulfill its function of power. In fact the forces of reaction had not given up hope that they could seize control of the security apparatus and use it to restore previous conditions. In 1968 they managed to achieve a series of objectives in this area. Discredit of the security apparatus was to serve, above all, as a basis of developing a campaign to discredit the party which was held responsible for everything that the Security did. It is interesting to note that during both periods the reactionaries used strikingly similar methods, and a practically identical vocabulary and phraseology, in their slander of the security apparatus.

[Question] The SNB came into existence in 1945 as a power tool of the people and as a guardian of the revolution; from the beginning it had extremely difficult and responsible assignments to fulfill. After the May revolution in had to ensure consolidation of conditions in the western frontier regions of our state; it led the fight against the last remaining Nazi terrorist groups scattered around our country, it searched out war criminals, collaborators and traitors and rendered them harmless, it protected the system of people's democracy and its economy. In the days of February 1948 it stood firmly on the side of the working class, and contributed its share to the downfall of the reactionaries.

[Answer] Col Jan Kovar: "Our generation remembers all of these things very well; how in the time of building socialism the SNB thwarted the actions of the overpowered exploiting classes, who later changed to illegal types of actions, or how members of the SNB uncovered espionage, terrorist and other activities of imperialist agents and of the post-February emigrants in their service. The great responsibility for the safeguard of the socialist system during those years was given to this apparatus and its various organizations; to insure a peaceful time for people to build socialism. And we are happy that we can with full responsibility proudly state that the SNB has never failed during its more than 30-year existence. In a tough and meritorious way it

has always prosecuted the enemies and evil-doers of our republic, it has assured dependable protection of our borders, watched over the safety of our citizens, national and cooperative property, and even watched over the peace and public order. Even though it did not manage to guard against some mistakes and errors during this wide range of activities.

[Question] We can then divide the history of the SNB into three different stages. The first is between the years 1945-1948 when the process of organizing the SNB took place along with the difficult struggle to maintain its people's and democratic character; the second stage is from 1948 when Victorious February opened the way for fundamental reorganization of the security apparatus based on socialist principles, while at the same time placing before it new, unusual duties. April 1969 marks the beginning of the third stage when a new Marxist-Leninist leadership was elected to head the Czechoslovak Communist Party, thereby creating conditions which enabled the Security factions, after living through the years of crisis, to go the way of political and labor consolidation.

[Answer] Lt Col Dr Vlastislav Kroupa: "The first two stages, which from the standpoint of time already belong to history, have their unforgettable days and years for us. Among the most important battle traditions of the SNB from this time period would be, for example, the encounters with the Nazi Werwolf groups, which infiltrated the Czech border areas, terrorized the population, and committed acts of subversion and sabotage immediately following the war. The heroic battles of members of the SNB against bandit-like groups in the Slovak mountains and in other places in the republic has also stepped into the consciousness of our citizens. The new people's democratic security apparatus had an undeniable part in uncovering the Ludacky conspiracy in Slovakia and in liquidating other enemy networks created in our country by Western spy agencies. Among the brightest pages in the tradition of struggle will always be the appearance of the SNB in February 1948, when its members unanimously proved their loyalty to the party, to the working class and to the ideals of socialism.

[Answer] Col Jan Kovar: Intensification of the class struggle came about after February. Illegal groups came into being which took care of organizing illegal crossings over state borders, completing and circulating seditious leaflets and other publications, spy activities and terrorism. Augustin Schramm, a partisan commander, became the first victim of terrorism. Since 1949 many agents from Western spy centers, especially from the well-known CIA, have been sent here to perform espionage, sabotage and other terrorist acts. After February ideological subversion, organized mainly by Radio Free Europe through its broadcasts, balloon operations and support of the traitorous emigration started to develop. This period, which was characterized by the coarse methods used by the enemy, by the extraordinary brutality and murder of those faithful to socialism, later changed into a period when foreigners worked through and began to use new devices of treacherous battle against us....."

[Question] This is all in direct contradiction to those things demanded by the reactionary forces in 1968-1969, which already were a thorn in the side of many members of the SNB! Let us, for the interest of it, quote two additional excerpts from articles in LITERARNI LISTY from 29/6 and 25/7 1968:

"We certainly cannot depend on a security apparatus which means insecurity to us".- "In their opinion (opinion of RUDE PRAVO--comment of the editors) how many persons are a part of the security apparatus in Czechoslovakia? (We do not mean, of course, the Public Security apparatus.) Don't they think that if this huge apparatus as a whole would concern itself with the fight against domestic crime and the real dangers to the republic from foreign countries, instead of chasing and uncovering criminals where there are none, that there would be enough in their membership to take care of growing criminality and then some?" If things were not as serious as they are, one would have to smile: after all the SNB membership never was, and even today is not, very large.

[Answer] Lt Col Dr Vlastislav Kroupa: "With respect to the duties which confronted and confront us, certainly not. As far as the new devices of struggle that Comrade Kovar mentioned, I would like to add that everything started with the downfall of the Hungarian counterrevolution, when the machine of imperialistic politics, directed toward a systematic liquidation of the socialist countries, reached a blind alley. Western spy agencies are abandoning their old, coarse methods of operation and are beginning to develop ideological subversion operations on a large scale. They are beginning to make full use of widening contact between East and West through increased tourist travel, livelier cultural and economic dealings, exchange programs and so on. Ideological penetration into the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is geared to certain, special groups of people, mainly to cultural workers, students and others. Czech counterintelligence agents have enough proof of this; however, in light of the whole development--which we know so well and which tragically brought about the events of 1968--they had neither the chance nor the strength to stop these operations."

[Question] We can say that the great success and happiness of our nation is due to the fact that the new leadership of the party purged parts of the Ministry of the Interior of rightist opportunist elements, that the political and ideological unity of the members of the SNB was strengthened and that they were given more power. In this stage of its development the SNB once again proved that it is indeed the guardian of the socialist establishment in Czechoslovakia, the faithful helpers of the Communist Party and the working class. We no longer have to worry about the fate of socialism. It is necessary, however, to constantly be on guard so that the years 1968-1969 can never again be repeated.

[Answer] Col Jan Kovar: "Yes, this was discussed at the 15th Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. The tasks which arose for members of the SNB as a result of the 15th Congress, are not, however, any easier than the ones that we recall as a part of our history. It is true, however, that the members of this part of the Ministry of the Interior will work under different

circumstances, within a different, a much more positive domestic and foreign political situation, with different, modern devices, techniques, methods and possibilities. They must, however, approach the situation with no less class and political awareness, with no less sense of zeal, consequence and personal responsibility than was the case during the time that the SNB was created and engaged in fierce class struggles."

[Question] Let us make a promise to do everything possible so that the revolutionary tradition of the SNB, its fights, struggles, sacrifices and victims will never be forgotten, and will become a torch passed on from one generation to the other. Let our articles about the lives of the members of the SNB also serve this end.

[Answer] Lt Col Dr Vlastislav Kroupa: "And not only that! In addition we should constantly remind ourselves that in today's world, when the enemy and Western spies and centers of subversion are using more ingenious and cunning methods, extreme sacrifices and bravery are not enough. These good and important characteristics of each member of the group, which were also characteristic of the SNB 20 and 30 years ago, must be expanded by mature technology and high specialization. Only then will the SNB be well enough prepared, in the spirit of the 15th Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, to act courageously in fulfilling the vocation, which is to be expected from each of its members in creating a developed socialist society.

9023

CSO: 2400

EAST GERMANY

GDR MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS REPORTED

Figures on Military Expenditures

West Berlin DIE WELT in German 17 Dec 76 p 2

[Text] "GDR" leaders, too, expect tempered economic growth in the coming years. In the debates on the budget for the five-year plan for 1976 to 1980 it became clear in the Volkskammer that the key figures for the state budget and the economic plan lie at the lower limit of the growth rates specified in the "directive" of the ninth party congress. Planning goals already set, such as increasing the production of industrial goods to 134 percent, were cautiously withdrawn.

Chairman of the State Council Willi Stoph explained that the most important goal is fulfilling the construction program, which provides for the erection and modernization of 75,000 dwellings by 1980. He assured that consumer prices would remain stable. Increased rates are intended primarily for the turnover of foreign trade and for agricultural and food production.

The state budget, the financial basis of the economic plan, provides for income and expenditures of 141 billion marks (as opposed to 132 billion marks for 1976, i.e., an increase of 7 percent). Of this sum 33.2 billion marks are allotted to subventions, which, for example, support rents or tariffs supported and finance expenditures in the areas of education and training.

In contrast to earlier years, defense expenditures were reported separately from expenditures for "public security, law enforcement, and border security." The purely military expenses were given as 7.87 billion marks (6.5 percent of the budget), the expenses for "public security" as 3.2 billion. The total sum is somewhat more than 11 billion marks--an increase of 800 million marks over 1976. That corresponds to an increase of 7.7 percent.

According to a recent commentary by military expert Karl Wilhelm Fricke, the "GDR" defense budget has increased by 61.1 percent since 1969. Over the same period the per capita financial expenditure for defense has increased from 372 to 602 marks (1976) per year. The corresponding expenditures in the FRG this year amount to 500 marks per capita.

Fricke attributes the increasing defense expenditures primarily to the development of better military technology. As a result of systematic changes in armament, the National People's Army has already received the third and fourth generation of weapons systems in tanks, aircraft, artillery, and missiles.

The London Institute for Strategic Studies assumes that since 1968 the "GDR's" alleged defense budget has drawn closer to the actual expenditure. The Institute points out that the "GDR" has no noteworthy defense industry of its own, but is dependent on Soviet imports.

In 1975 about 290 out of every 10,000 residents of the "GDR" "bore arms," including 110 members of the People's Army and 180 soldiers in the border troops and the armed combat groups in the plants. In the FRG, by contrast, there are 83 soldiers (Bundeswehr and border guard) for every 10,000 residents.

GDR Military Involvement in Africa

West Berlin DIE WELT in German 25 Jan 77 p 3

[Article by Heinz Vielain, Bonn correspondent: "Study Reveals "GDR" Involvement in Revolutionary Movements in Africa"]

[Text] The "GDR" has been involved behind the scenes in all revolutionary movements in Africa and thus won considerable influence in areas of this continent. A study by the Research Institute for Political Sciences of Cologne University now provides detailed information. According to the Institute, East Berlin primarily made a large contribution to the military equipment of so-called liberation organizations.

The hitherto unpublished study states that the point of departure for the current Africa policy of the "GDR" was the "basic agreement between the two German states." The subsequent wave of recognition helped "GDR" diplomacy break through almost everywhere in Africa. The resultant political opportunities were offensively exploited by East Berlin. When after the military putsch in Portugal African territories such as Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Sao Tome, and Principe received their independence, the "GDR" had already been making thorough preparations for a long time.

With the liquidation of the Portuguese colonial realm in Africa, according to the study, a political subsystem arose for which the socialist countries served the function of strategic hinterland. As one of the "most committed protagonists of anticolonial emancipation," the "GDR" was a valued partner here. "By cultivating close contacts with the liberation movements in Southwest Africa, Rhodesia, and the Republic of South Africa, East Berlin has set the switches for an expansion of the GDR presence in southern Africa."

The study begins with an overview of the "GDR's" involvement in Africa thus far. Regarding East Berlin's relations with the liberation organization

MPLA and the People's Republic of Angola, it states that the "combative solidarity" manifests itself today more strongly than ever before. Next to the Soviet Union and Cuba the "GDR" constitutes the most massive foreign presence in Angola. "Specialists from the National People's Army are training members of the Angolan armed forces. GDR pilots are sitting at the controls of Mig 21 jet fighter planes."

Although there are no exact figures on the "GDR's" military assistance in Angola, it is certain that East Berlin's involvement in Africa is costing it something. By the middle of September of last year, more than 10,000 tons primarily of defense goods had gone to Angola as "solidarity freight." In the last quarter of 1975 alone, three shiploads of "GDR" war material were unloaded, including heavy weapons. According to the Institute's information, East Berlin also spends considerable funds to train soldiers and specialists in Angola and other African countries.

The study concludes by stating that the close relations between the "GDR" and the Mozambique liberation front likewise dated back to the days of the war against Portugal.

8992

CSO: 2300

EAST GERMANY

STRUCTURE, STAFFING OF BEZIRK COUNCILS ANALYZED

Bonn INFORMATIONEN in German No 25, Dec 76 pp 8-10

[FRG Ministry for Inner-German Relations analysis: "New Structure of GDR Bezirk Councils"]

[Text] At the constitutional sessions of the 14 bezirk congresses of the GDR, whose members were selected along with the Volkskammer delegates on 17 October 1976, the bezirk council members were newly appointed in November. As with the new constitution of the bezirk councils after the previous bezirk congress elections in December 1971, no incisive changes have resulted this time either. In all 14 bezirks the council chairmen were confirmed in their positions. Only among the first deputies and the other deputies as well as the other members of the bezirk councils were some positions newly filled. The structure of the bezirk councils also remained essentially unchanged.

The following synopsis gives the names of the bezirk council chairmen confirmed in their office, their ages, and the dates they assumed office:

Bezirk:	Chairman:	in office since:
Cottbus	Uschkamp, Irma, 47 years old, graduate economist	May 1971
Dresden	Scheler, Manfred, 47 years old, graduate political scientist	June 1963
Erfurt	Gothe, Richard, 47 years old, graduate social scientist	October 1962
Frankfurt	Sommer, Siegfried, 51 years old, graduate social scientist	June 1969
Gera	Bahmann, Rudolf, 47 years old, graduate social scientist	March 1973

Halle	Klapproth, Helmut, 48 years old, graduate economist	May 1966
Karl-Marx-Stadt	Arnold, Heinz, 56 years old, graduate political scientist	November 1963
Leipzig	Opitz, Rudolf, 47 years old, graduate lawyer	February 1974
Magdeburg	Ranke, Kurt, 56 years old	July 1960
Neubrandenburg	Sperling, Gottfried, 55 years old	April 1972
Potsdam	Eidner, Werner, 52 years old, graduate economist	February 1972
Rostock	Marlow, Willi, 48 years old, graduate political scientist	June 1969
Schwerin	Fleck, Rudi, 45 years old, graduate political scientist	May 1968
Suhl	Zimmermann, Arnold, 54 years old, graduate engineering economist	July 1967

The council chairmen of the bezirks, who have all-except for Ranke (Magdeburg) and Sperling (Neubrandenburg)--earned academic titles at colleges or universities, are between 45 and 56 years old. Except 4, who only assumed the council chairmanship of their bezirks during the last legislative period (Bahmann, Gera; Opitz, Leipzig; Sperling, Neubrandenburg; Eidner, Potsdam), all bezirk council chairmen have been in office longer than 5 years, 5 already longer than 10 years; the most senior council chairman is Kurt Ranke (Magdeburg), who has already exercised his function for 16 years. Among the 14 council chairmen there is one woman (Uschkamp, Cottbus). By virtue of their position, the council chairmen, who are exclusively SED members, are members of the secretariat of their respective SED Bezirk Directorate. Arnold Zimmermann (Suhl) is a candidate for the SED Central Committee; Werner Eidner (Potsdam) is a member of the Central Revision Commission of the SED.

Of the first deputies, three lost their positions--in Karl-Marx-Stadt, Magdeburg, and Neubrandenburg. There were several changes among the other deputies, who as a rule administer a department along with their deputy function. In Erfurt Bezirk, for example, the deputy for internal affairs was changed, in Gera the deputy for trade and supply, in Halle the deputy for internal affairs, in Karl-Marx-Stadt the deputy for environmental protection and water management, in Neubrandenburg the deputy for trade and supply. In Rostock Bezirk the posts of two deputies were newly filled: the deputy for internal affairs and the deputy for bezirk-administered industry and food industry. In Gera Bezirk

the post of council secretary was also newly filled. In Frankfurt Bezirk the chairman of the bezirk planning commission lost his position as deputy; instead he became chairman of the Workers-and-Peasants Inspectorate of the same bezirk.

There have been no essential changes in the structure of the bezirk councils. They continue to have 19 or 20 members. In accordance with the economic emphasis, departmental divisions in the various bezirks vary only slightly from one another. By way of comparison, the council members of two bezirks (Potsdam and Rostock) are arranged alongside each other in the following synopsis, in the official order for both bezirks:

Potsdam	Rostock
- Chairman of the Council	- Chairman of the Council
- First Deputy	- First Deputy
- Deputy and Chairman of the Bezirk Planning Commission	- Deputy and Chairman of the Bezirk Planning Commission
- Deputy for Bezirk-Administered Industry and Local Supply, Chairman of the Economic Council	- Deputy for Bezirk-Administered Industry and Food Industry, Chair- man of the Economic Council
- Deputy for Agriculture, Forestry, and the Foodstuffs Industry	- Deputy for Agriculture, Forestry, and the Foodstuffs Industry
- Deputy for Internal Affairs	- Deputy for Internal Affairs
- Deputy for Trade and Supply	- Deputy for Trade and Supply
- Deputy for Posts and Telecommuni- cations	- Deputy for Labor, Wages, and Housing - Deputy for Recreation
- Secretary of the Bezirk Council	- Secretary of the Bezirk Council
- Member of the Council for Finances and Prices	- Member of the Council for Finances and Prices
- Bezirk Construction Director	- Bezirk Construction Director
- Member of the Council for Housing Policy	- Member of the Council for Local Supply
- Member of the Council for Labor and Wages	- Member of the Council for Posts and Telecommunications
- Member of the Council for Environ- mental Protection and Water Manage- ment	- Member of the Council for Environmental Protection and Water Management

- | | |
|---|---|
| - Bezirk School Advisor | - Bezirk School Advisor |
| - Member of the Council for Culture | - Member of the Council for Culture |
| - Member of the Council for Youth Affairs, Physical Culture, and Sports | - Member of the Council for Youth Affairs, Physical Culture, and Sports |
| - Bezirk Physician | - Bezirk Physician |
| - Member of the Council for Recreation | |

This synopsis shows, for example, that in Rostock Bezirk, with its Baltic Sea resorts, greater importance is attached to the department of recreation than in Potsdam Bezirk. The department chief for recreation in Rostock Bezirk is therefore a deputy, while the chief of the same department in Potsdam Bezirk is simply a council member.

Such nuances are also to be found in other bezirk councils. Thus, for example, the department chief for environmental protection and water management in Erfurt Bezirk, with its many reservoirs and dams, is also a deputy. Likewise a deputy is the department chief for territorial coordination of the construction of a power plant in Magdeburg Bezirk, where the third nuclear power plant in the GDR is now being built.

Of the 19 or 20 council members in the bezirks, as a rule only 4 do not belong to the SED. These 4 departments are directed by a member of the other GDR parties (CDU, LDPD, NDPD, DBD). In all bezirks, however, the following permanent positions are occupied exclusively by SED members:

- the chairman of the council,
- the first deputy
- the chairman of the planning commission
- the deputy for bezirk-administered industry,
- the deputy for internal affairs.

For some years the economic councils of the bezirks have no longer been administrative organs, but only special departments of the bezirk councils. They still have a certain administrative function economically within the bezirk and participate in the preparation, execution, and control of the resolutions of the bezirk congress and the bezirk council. In accordance with the principle of double subordination, they are subordinate both to the minister for bezirk-administered industry and food industry and to the council of the responsible bezirk. The chairman of the economic council of the bezirk is as a rule the deputy for bezirk-administered industry and food industry.

EAST GERMANY

IMPORTANCE OF BEZIRK PLANT NEWSPAPERS EMPHASIZED

East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG in German 3 Feb 77 p 2

[BZ report: "Growing Importance of Our Plant Newspapers--Secretariat of SED Bezirk Management Consulted With Plant Newspaper and Plant Radio Editors"]

[Text] The secretariat of the SED bezirk management in Berlin consulted with the editors of the plant newspapers and plant radios in Berlin on 2 February. The secretaries of the basic organizations of the SED and responsible members of the bezirk management and the kreis managements were present.

Konrad Naumann, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee and first secretary of the Berlin bezirk management, spoke on the tasks of mass-policy work in the further realization of the resolutions of the Ninth SED Congress. He emphasized the increasing importance in this connection of effectively structured plant newspapers and plant radio broadcasts--as collective agitator, propagandist, and organizer. Above all, this requires increased attention to the quality of content, the ideological level of the contributions.

Mass-policy work is to be directed above all at the following key points: the convincing demonstration of the SED's successful policy for the benefit of the people; the continual elucidation of the values, advantages, and superiority of socialism; the further consolidation of our military alliance with the Soviet Union and the other socialist states--particularly in view of the 60th Anniversary of the Great Socialist October Revolution. He clarified the tasks of the economic plan for 1977.

To bind the party even more closely to the working class and all workers, emphasized Konrad Naumann, is the key to further success. A prerequisite for this is even greater care that the workers' words determine the content of the plant newspapers. It is of high political importance, underlined Konrad Naumann, "to follow up systematically the many clever ideas, hints, and critiques of the workers." Every plant newspaper and every radio studio must be a tribunal of socialist democracy in the plant. Experience teaches that the more comprehensively plant members collaborate in shaping their newspaper and the broadcasts of their radio studios, the more politically specific and lively they are.

A basic concern of the organs of the plant party organizations, said Konrad Naumann, is the further development of the energy, initiative, and creativity of the workers in realizing the main task. The great efforts in the struggle for the complete fulfillment and resolute overachievement of the 1977 economic plan should be graphically displayed. In this regard the manifold mobilizing influence of the plant newspapers and plant radio studios on socialist competition has particular weight in hastening scientific progress, for high quality, economy of material, reduction of costs, and better use of basic resources and working time.

"In this regard it is important always to remember that it is not possible to be specific in party work without proceeding from the actual problems and questions of our colleagues. Above all this means giving even greater prominence to the consciousness-raising powers rooted in the unity of economic and social policy in consistent realization of the policy of the main task."

Konrad Naumann explained in detail the tasks involved in the preparation and execution of the party elections beginning 1 March 1977 and thanked all party activists of the Berlin plants for their great creative work in realizing the resolutions of the ninth party congress.

8992

CSO: 2300

NEW VOCATIONAL TRAINING SYSTEM DESCRIBED

Bonn INFORMATIONEN in German No 2, 1977 pp 10-11

[Text] This year, there are in the GDR 290 skilled trades for those leaving school, while in 1976 there were 307. This is described in the third implementation regulation for the directive on the classification of skilled trades, which took effect at the end of last year. Students who have finished grade 10 of the general polytechnical school can now apply for 224 skilled trades with 555 specialization opportunities. For students who completed only grade 8 the new system provides 66 skilled trades, which have been adapted to the development level of this group. Students who have not finished grade 8 will in the future no longer be admitted to vocational training but will receive 1 or 2-year training in certain areas of skilled work.

The new classification distinguishes between the following three groups only:

- Skilled trades for grade 10 graduates;
- Skilled trades for those who have finished grade 8;
- Skilled trades which can be learned exclusively within the framework of adult education.

In newly establishing 224 skilled trades for grade 10 graduates, it was assumed that the advances in technology over the past years had to be considered in the occupational structure. This has resulted, among other things, in the inclusion of 13 new professions in the system, e.g. skilled restaurant worker and skilled customer service worker. On the other hand, four skilled trades were eliminated: pipe fitter, railroad car mechanic, foreign trade salesman, foreign language correspondent. Training in these occupations will now fall into the following categories: engine fitter and trade and industry personnel. Some 17 other skilled trades have been integrated into already existing professions, e.g. radio specialist and telecommunications mechanic into the category of skilled communications worker. In addition the descriptions of 24 skilled trades have been changed.

The section chief in the state secretariat for vocational training, Rolf Balzer, explained why the new system separates skilled trades for grade 10 graduates from those for students who leave school at the end of grade 8. He said that "the right to 10-grade mandatory schooling has now been fully established. It is known that with the 1965 law establishing a unified socialist educational system 10-grade mandatory schooling was started and is now in full effect. Now all students have the opportunity to go through grade 10. The majority of graduates leave school after successful completion of grade 10. Therefore, the most occupations are available for graduates of grade 10. They base their requirements in principle on a grade 10 high school preparation."

This statement is further explained in a broadcast by Radio DDR I:

"When, several years ago it was decided that apprenticeship for students who have completed grade 10 should last 2 years, and for students who leave school after grade 8, 3 years, it was in keeping with our specific situation at that time. No deadline had been set for establishing the 10-year secondary school; the new system was being built up gradually. There were the problems of providing the material conditions, of retraining teachers, etc. This meant that for a considerable time a part of our students would not be able to attend grades 9 and 10. Therefore, they had to be given the opportunity to complete the 10th grade during their vocational training. Meanwhile, the situation has changed, and today more than 92 percent of our students attend school beyond grade 8."

The separation in our educational system of students leaving school after grade 10 from those leaving school after grade 8 gives rise to different vocational training opportunities even in individual occupational categories. Those who leave school after grade 10 can, for example, learn to be foundry specialists, whereas those leaving school after grade 8 can only become skilled foundry workers. The work of a mason is open only for those who have completed grade 10. Those who leave school after grade 8 may learn the work of a mason's helper, who essentially performs only simple tasks. For a mason's helper--as in all other work for those leaving school after grade 8--manual work without the help of machines has priority.

The new system of skilled trades in the GDR is obviously meant to raise the level of education and to produce a greater number of trained specialists. This is made clear by a comparison of skilled worker training for the time of the last five-year plan (1971 to 1975) and the planned skilled worker training for the time of the new five-year plan (1976 to 1980):

--Between 1971 and 1975, 920,000 young people underwent vocational training to become skilled workers. In 1975, 49.5 percent of all persons employed had specialized training.

--From 1976 to 1980, more than 1 million young people are to be trained as skilled workers. It is also expected that more than 300,000 working people will qualify as skilled workers. In reaching this goal, according to GDR statistics, the share of skilled workers among all working people would be raised to about 60 percent.

IMPORTANCE OF DEMOCRACY, DISCIPLINE IN SOCIALISM STRESSED

Warsaw ZA WOLNOSC I LUD in Polish 15 Jan 77 pp 1, 13

[Article by Lech Winiarski: "Party Viewpoint: Democracy and Discipline"]

[Text] One frequently encounters persons who somehow cannot reconcile in their minds these two basic elements of socialism. Depending on circumstances, they are inclined to prefer either the democratic style of administration or a kind of discipline which permits no discussion on the subject of objective, means and methods of action by the collective. They fail to understand that democracy and discipline are elements which are by no means contradictory but which mutually supplement one another.

Naturally in the area of action, in the process of producing material goods, discipline, order, and responsibility for performance of tasks are a direct condition for production growth and improvement. This does not signify, however, that we are dealing here with discipline in general. There can also be a type of discipline which is based solely on obedience and uncritical execution of orders. This is primitive discipline, called simply drill. Under socialist conditions it cannot be a model of attitude in behavior.

Why? Simply because we seek to develop in people conscious discipline, which is based not on performing tasks only under the eye of one's superior, only under the threat of punishment, but based on voluntary firmness, proceeding from the deepest conviction of the utility of and need for honest labor -- for the country, for the nation, and for oneself.

This kind of discipline, which proceeds from love of the socialist homeland and linking of one's own personal interests with the prosperity of one's country, can be secured only by a democratic style of administration and management -- securing commitment by people to make decisions and not only to execute actions.

The democratic style of action is a factor which produces a political climate strengthening commitment on the part of citizens to undertake

complex tasks, to overcome difficulties, for debate, exchange of views and criticism of deficiencies greatly enrich our capabilities of action. At the Seventh PZPR congress Edward Gierek took an explicit position in this matter: "The more complex the tasks we undertake, the more independence and mass initiative they demand, the more consistently we must strengthen and implement socialist democracy in practice."

This position was also confirmed in the proceedings of the recent Fifth Central Committee Plenum, which specified the further directions of Poland's socioeconomic development.

Intellectual Potential of Poles

Calling for the opinion of the worker class and the public as a whole, and on a microscale appealing to the experience and wisdom of work forces, is acquiring increasing significance -- contrary to technocratic theories, which view public opinion as incompetent for participation in resolving complicated processes of the present day. Let us look at the unusually rapid growth of intellectual potential of the Poles, to become convinced of their creative capabilities. In a period of 30 years the number of citizens with higher education has increased 20-fold, while the number of citizens with secondary education has increased almost 40-fold.

Poland's working class today cannot even be compared with what it was in the first postwar years. A total of 23.5 percent have received occupational training, while 3.8 percent have received higher secondary and postsecondary education. In industry 32.5 percent of workers have received more than basic schooling, and in construction the figure is 27.8 percent. In recent years 90 percent of young workers entering the labor force for the first time have completed schooling at the elementary level.

These facts are the best argument that the worker class and Polish society as a whole are basing their aspirations for participation in government and application of the principles of socialist democracy on increasingly better occupational training and general education. Utilization of these capabilities, of this intellectual and emotional capital, is a major task of all party echelons. Attention was drawn to this by the last two PZPR congresses and the resolutions of Central Committee plenums, as well as decisions made at the lower party echelons. The documents of the highest party authorities contain rich development and specification of the principles of socialist democracy, which we should not forget.

Against Formalism

The institutional guarantees contained in these documents and in government enactments comprise the framework of our system, which should be filled in with living content on a day-by-day basis. We have been doing this successfully in recent years -- achieving impressive results in

transforming Poland's countenance. There frequently occur, however, instances of a formalistic interpretation of the principles of democracy, which impoverishes both public initiative and discipline in carrying out decisions. Let us consider just what such formalism is from the party's standpoint.

Here is an example. In recent years we have done much to strengthen the influence of the worker class in the party and state. Worker representation has increased substantially in the Sejm, in the people's councils, in the Central Committee and local PZPR bodies. In practice, however, we sometimes encounter the following facts: a speech to be delivered at a plenary session or plant administrative conference is prepared for a worker who is a party committee member -- just to ensure that he does not go off on a tangent or talk too much about the plant. He is simply handed a ready text. All he does is go up onto the speaker's platform and read it off. Naturally such a speech cannot be an authentic reflection of the views and attitudes of the work force. It cannot represent the genuine point of view of that primary party organization. But do we vigorously oppose practices of this kind? Unfortunately, all too frequently we do nothing about it.

We also too readily accept other kinds of manifestations of formalism, such as presenting completely ready plans and solutions to the participants at some conferences, meetings and consultation sessions. The program report is so detailed and without alternatives that one really knows in advance that there is nothing to debate.

Let us recall at this point the important decision contained in the resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the PZPR: "In the process of shaping party policy and programming party actions, we should to a constantly increasing degree make use of different assessments of the same problem, and in decision making consider different decision variants."

This is in very emphatic contrast to the formalism of meetings, an appeal for genuine exchange of views, for confrontation of opinions and collective elaboration of programs. This was expressed in the famous slogan: "Greater discussion prior to decision making -- greater discipline in decision implementation."

Another example of formalism at meetings is the "professional" and technocratic drafting of reports, the position that their content can be comprehended only by a narrow group of specialists. Various technical processes are discussed, and economic indices are juggled about, forgetting about the need to assess people's attitudes and actions. This constitutes technocratic distortion, which -- contrary to appearances -- is by no means an expression of dominance of the canons of the present day. Contemporaneity is determined not only by acquaintance with the laws governing the motions of machinery, the properties of raw materials and sources of

energy, but primarily knowledge of the laws regulating human behavior. What is needed is a humanistic approach, knowledge of the principles of sociology and psychology, which are important components of ideological-political work.

Standard of Democracy

We could cite many manifestations of formalism. They include, for example, excessively detailed and delayed presentation to the worker self-government committee of plan indices, as a result of which there is neither time nor freedom to adjust, in order for worker self-government genuinely to exercise its initiative. The people's council will be acting in a formalistic manner when it restricts itself at meetings to passive acceptance of the top officials' report -- without a real evaluation, without exposing this report to the feelings of the voters on the subject of the performance of government. At such times representative democracy is deficient, and this is contrary to the political aspirations of the citizenry and contrary to the express decisions of the Sixth and Seventh PZPR Congresses.

In all these cases insufficient participation in deciding courses of action will inevitably diminish people's emotional involvement in decision execution and will weaken discipline and self-control at the task performance stage.

The party, its officials and every primary party organization must constitute a model of democratic action and ideological mobilization, both for thought and for deed. Party teams, both in the people's councils and in all cooperative and self-government bodies -- must function as promoters of progress, working in cooperation with the officials of brother parties: the United Peasant Party and Democratic Party, as well as party-unaffiliated public-spirited citizens in encouraging initiative and in deepening grass-roots monitoring of the performance of the administrative-economic edifice. (Interpress)

8817

CSO: 2600

LACK OF LEGAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO CITIZENS SCORED

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 7, 12 Feb 77 pp 1, 6

[Article by Stanislaw Podemski: "Impenetrable Sections"]

[Text] A trait of the good citizen is fulfillment of one's obligation toward one's fellow citizens, and a citizen's right is full utilization of the opportunities and privileges offered by our system. Is it easy to be a person who in his daily contacts with the authorities has good feelings as a citizen? Does each of us feel that he is a subject of the law and not an object of secret manipulations by government agencies? Are relations between administration and petitioners based on the principle of equality, deriving from the fact that both parties are governed by the same laws?

In spite of legislative planning, legislative reform, and reduction in the number of regulations, our legal system remains baroque in character. The law should be clear and understandable to the layman and should avoid excessive detail. These principles perish, however, when confronted with bad, persisting customs, administrative haste and other defects dictated by prosaic daily life.

Our law also contains a defect which is rarely perceived by those who sincerely desire its improvement. In practice it is all too frequently impenetrable, and therefore unfamiliar. It constitutes an object of speculation and not knowledge. It rests in an office drawer or file cabinet instead of loudly, publicly and openly informing the citizen of his rights and obligations.

A study conducted last September by the Ministry of Labor, Wages and Social Services on almost 100 arbitration commissions indicated that the principal group of cases arising (close to 50 percent) are financial disputes between employee and employer. In the labor and social security courts in the first half of 1976 disputes over compensation were the second most common, following litigations over discharging of employees.

This is certainly due to the fact that regulations are particularly numerous in the area of wages, regulations which are in practice difficult to understand, frequently obscure, and written carelessly, legal specialists claim, without observance of the principles of legislative art. The professional weakness of the worker services at enterprises and the lack of professional competence of plant councils, is expressed in the inability to inform the worker on his rights in a competent and convincing manner. An arbitration commission for a labor court hearing then constitutes the sole method of clarifying the matter to all those persons involved in the case.

The labor code leaves the area of wages to the collective labor agreements which are binding in the individual branches and sectors, and there are 85 of these. Added to these are numerous annexes, plant wage bonus regulations and directives by agency chiefs. Even the court, let alone the average employee, has difficulty gaining familiarity with this group of regulations. And when the court must decide who is entitled to a wage supplement for a job injurious to the health, a performance bonus, a bonus for export, it must request the employer in question to provide a complete set of applicable wage regulations. But what if the employer does not supply a document which is disadvantageous to the employer, in order to influence the judgment, or as a result of a general state of disorder in the enterprise's regulations? Then it can easily happen that the court will reach a judgment without knowledge of the actual legal situation. This is a situation without precedent, where a party to a dispute decides the scope of the court's legal knowledge. A student studying Roman law learns the ancient maxim that "the judge knows the law."

Director J. Pietraszewski of the Ministry of Justice, administrative chief of labor arbitration judges, assesses the situation as follows in an article entitled "Root of Disputes": "The great number of wage regulations, their unclear or ambiguous wording, as well as the fact that some lower-level regulations are in contradiction with higher-level regulations and sometimes even with the labor code" (GAZETA PRAWNICZA, No 1, 1977).

Eloquent materials can be found in two issues last year of DZIENNIK URZEDOWY, No 12, of the Ministry of Agriculture, and No 15 of the Ministry of Finance. In the former there are 32 pages and in the latter 45 pages of listing of regulations which, in addition to the general regulations specified in the legal enactments of these ministries, are currently in force. Among this listing, quite frequently is repeated the information "regulation not published."

How is the beekeeper supposed to find out that he does not pay income and turnover tax? How does a farmer from Rzeszow Voivodship obtain information on the tax benefits to which he is entitled and on what he owes for electrification? How is a farmer from Wroclaw Voivodship "in the Sudeten region" supposed to find out about similar financial benefits to which he also is entitled? How is one to know the content of the regulations

governing land enfranchisement for urban residents, or another which regulates consolidation and exchange of landholdings, since these apply to that family of regulations which have never been published? According to an estimate of the Council of Ministers Legal Office, the formula "not published" frequently continues to appear in lists of legal enactments in other ministries as well.

Where Can It Be Obtained?

Let us say, however, that a legal enactment of interest to a citizen has been published. Ministries, voivodship agencies and people's councils, institutions which administer the citizen's daily affairs, publish their gazettes, including the Social Security Establishment and the Central Union of Housing Construction Cooperatives. In 1976 the gazette of the Ministry of Health and Social Services came out 22 times up to the middle of November and contained 75 items. The Ministry of Finance gazette published on 20 December bears No 20 (40 items); up to 20 November the Ministry of Education had published 11 issues of its gazette (91 items), the Central Union of Housing Construction Cooperatives had issued 13 bulletins with 86 resolutions of the Union Central Board, plus communiqués and directives. Voivodship people's councils are by no means at the bottom of the list in production of legal enactments (Szczecin -- up to 15 November 1976 11 gazette issues and 81 items; Warsaw -- up to 15 November 1976 19 issues and 105 items). It is incorrect that this reading is intended only for administrators, councillors and officials.

How much should one pay a homemaker who uses his own equipment or maintains the customer's equipment? In order to find out, one would have to read Gazette No 5, 1976, of the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Services. What are the threatened consequences to the owner of a house built without permission from the power establishment? The answer can be found in Gazette No 4 of the Ministry of Administration, Local Economy and Environmental Protection. It publishes a regulation issued by two ministers, specifying responsibility. Who temporarily loses his retirement benefits and who does not when he takes a job in trade, services, and public food services? Fifty-four job categories are specified by Gazette No 10 of the Social Security Bureau, and only he who reads it and finds his job category will know what to expect. In the gazettes of the voivodship people's councils, Kielce Voivodship regulates the amount of compensation for expropriated land (No 11), the Municipal People's Council in Chelm specifies the dog tax and exclusions from this taxation (No 1) (this enactment states in all seriousness: Dogs of foreign personnel of diplomatic missions and consular establishments of foreign countries shall be exempt from taxation), while the voivodship people's council in Ciechanow (No 6) states that henceforth self-employed sausage makers and automotive mechanics will pay lower taxes.

Following are the titles of the first legal enactments published in the Bulletin of the Central Union of Housing Construction Collectives:

Regarding Early Repayment of Loans for Privately-Owned Apartments, Financing Construction or Utilization of Garages and Parking Spaces, Exchange of Cooperative Apartments and Financial Settlement with the Cooperative Member Effecting the Exchange. From the listed regulations of the Central Union Board one can see how much information the member of a cooperative will find here, a person who is frequently involved in financial disputes with his cooperative. Cooperative law, although revised, dates from 1961, is quite general and fails to answer many specific questions. Decisions of the Central Union provide these answers.

Source of Complaints

It is not easy to gain access to administrative gazettes. They are not the same as DZIENNIK USTAW, or MONITOR, which can be purchased at any court of any size or examined at gmina offices. Subscription is a simple matter, for it as a rule arrives by mail. Purchase of a single, specifically needed copy, however, requires a visit to the gazette editorial offices or administrative offices in Warsaw, Lodz, or Katowice. The Ministry of Labor, Wages and Social Services refers the inquirer to the Ruch distribution center in Warsaw (the ministry is not involved in sales), while the Ministry of Education refers the inquirer to Lodz (Periodicals and Books Distribution Enterprise), and the Central Union of Housing Construction Cooperatives directs the prospective subscriber to Inowroclaw. The large circulations of the ministry gazettes (from 20 to 90,000 copies) drop off with the voivodship people's council publications. A person living in Lodz or Zielona Gora does not have a chance of purchasing a copy, for a published issue of regulations and directives would come out in 860 or 750 copies.

If it is difficult to become acquainted with the law, when only the official, but not the citizen, knows the law, this has social consequences. In a dispute between a citizen and a government agency, there are frequently at the outset two unequal parties. Such legal enactments become secret knowledge. Distrust piles up, and such a situation promotes arbitrary interpretation of regulations and worsens relations between government agency and petitioner which are already not the best.

When at the beginning of last year the Ministry of Administration, Local Economy and Environmental Protection examined complaints against administrative authorities, the conclusion was obvious. A large part of these complaints never would have been lodged if the complainants had known their rights and obligations. It is not surprising that the latest issues of the monthly ADMINISTRACJA I GOSPODARKA TERENOWA finds it advisable forcefully to remind officials of the real primer of their obligations, spelled out in the code of administrative conduct for the last 15 years.

For 10 years now I have served as legal adviser to the readers of TRYBUNA LUDU, and my experience coincides with the conclusions of the ministerial edifice: a good many of the complaints to the editors never would have been made if the reserves of the law had not been inaccessible.

How can this be changed? We should increase, when necessary, the circulation of legal gazettes, while we should reduce the number of issued regulations and their loquacity (for example, multiple-sheet people's council regulations are published which repeat the content of the law on people's councils), and these items should be placed on general sale (kiosks, bookstores); all issued regulations should be published, unless they are genuinely of interest only to government officials (for example, office internal organization).

What is Possible

Our laws are frequently created with a thought to the citizens and their interests, but not to the functioning of government establishments. However, the system of distribution of legal enactments is such that frequently only administrative officials know the rights and obligations of citizens. Therefore the citizen petitioner is a defenseless party without counsel and knows what he can or must do only from what an official communicates to him and how he interprets a regulation.

The Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the PZPR, held on 20 February 1976, stressed the fundamental importance of the rule of law and proper state-citizen relations, based on mutual execution of duties and obligations. The conviction that the citizen will fully utilize his rights and will conscientiously carry out his obligations to the collective merely as a result of his general conviction that the state is the highest good and acts in his interests would be a delusion. The "citizen orientation" of the individual alone is insufficient. Each of us must know what he may do and what he must do -- not in general, but specifically. One must feel at home with legal regulations. Otherwise one has the feeling that an official can twist the law any way he chooses. This does not promote a good citizen attitude, does not promote a climate of trust in relations between government agency and citizen petitioner, and does not promote comfortable feelings on the part of the public.

8817

COS: 2600

HISTORY TEACHING IN REFORMED SYSTEM DEBATED

Conference Report

Warsaw NOWA SZKOLA in Polish Jan 77 pp 26-28

[Article by Teresa Pioro: "Conference of Historians in Kalisz"]

[Text] Kalisz, one of the oldest cities in Poland, was the site of the First Polish Conference of Historians, which was attended by more than 300 history scholars and teachers from all over Poland. The conference, convening on 21-22 September, was organized by the Polish Historical Society, in coordination with the Science and Education Division of the Central Committee of the PZPR, the Polish Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Science, Higher and Technical Education, as well as the Ministry of National Defense.

The importance of the Kalisz debate was emphasized by the presence of top government officials as well as education officials: Prof Dr Jarema Maciszewski, chief of the Science and Education Division of the Central Committee of the PZPR; Jerzy Kuberski, Minister of Education; Prof Dr Janusz Gorski, Vice-Minister of Science, Higher and Technical Education; Brig Gen Tadeusz Szacilo, Deputy Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Polish Army. A letter of good wishes for the conference was sent by Prof Dr Henryk Jablonski, Chairman of the State Council.

The purpose of this national scholarly conference was to specify the place and role of history in the system of socialist education as well as the concept of teaching history in the reformed secondary school.

Place and Role of History in the Socialist Society

Three papers were delivered as an introduction to the discussion on the first day of the conference, dealing with general problems: a paper by Prof Dr Stefan Kieniewicz, Chairman of the Historical Sciences Committee of the Polish Academy of Sciences, entitled "The Place and Role of History in Educating the Younger Generation"; a paper by Prof Dr Jerzy Topolski

entitled "The Didactic Values of History in Its Role in Socialist Indoctrination"; a speech by Brig Gen Tadeusz Szacilo, who discussed the importance of tradition in the defense indoctrination of the public.

Prof S. Kieniewicz employed a poetic aphorism by Norwid as a point of departure for discussion on the topic of the indoctrinational role of history: "The past is today, only a bit further removed," which means that the past lives in each of us, that we are influenced by our past. Inasmuch as we are the product of past centuries to some degree, we must understand these past centuries. We must cognize them if we wish to comprehend ourselves, or even better, determine ourselves, stated Professor Kieniewicz, mentioning three groups of problems rooted in the history of the Polish people and of importance for the Polish "today."

"The first group of problems deals with Poland's place in the world, or more precisely in Europe, and even more precisely, in East-Central Europe.... Our relations with East and West continue to be a question of our very existence. Today these are friendly, good-neighbor relations, more secure for our people than at any time in the last three centuries. We enjoy stable borders and prospects of continued peace. But this does not mean that all tensions and grievances between neighbors have been overcome. It would be a mistake if we tried to persuade ourselves and our people that those tensions no longer exist. It is our obligation as historians to work to defuse these tensions. Animosity between neighbors usually lasts longer than the reasons which caused it.... Each nation appraises from its own point of view the balance of mutual wrongs. It is precisely the historian who has been trained to be able to consider as well the viewpoint and feelings of the other side. His efforts to put an end to harmful hatreds and prejudices should not consist in glossing over past conflicts but in factual demonstration of their sources, without hiding responsibility on both sides.

"The second group of historical problems which are of great importance today is connected with the structure of our society.... The last half century has deepened Poland's democratization but has not leveled the differences, has not removed all prejudices, animosity and envy among the component elements of our society. Historiography can help defuse these complexes, showing their sources in the past, differentiating phenomena which are common to all countries in this part of Europe at a given stage of development from those phenomena which are specifically Polish; taking the interest of the masses as the basic criterion for evaluation, in the Marxist manner, but also endeavoring to reconstitute and understand the ways and mentality of the former privileged classes; avoiding anachronistic assessments but also properly appraising those units and groupings which stood out in contrast to the schemes of customs and manners and which were ahead of their time.

"...The third historical group of problems comprises the area of culture.... Up until the last war history in the secondary school was almost

exclusively political history. In People's Poland it became for the most part economic and social history which, as we know, has not helped make it popular with young people. Who knows, maybe the future of the school subject of history and a rebirth of interest in history lies precisely in broader consideration of cultural problems."

Prof Dr Jerzy Topolski, discussing the didactic values of history, stated: "in studying history, we study historical thought -- this statement could contain the meaning of the fundamental didactic value of history. What is historical thought, however, and is it good (for a person involved in current affairs) to acquire the ability of historical thinking? At first glance it might seem that there is a contradiction between focusing on current affairs and focusing on historical thought. Many people share the conviction that this is a contradiction....

"One can state that on the ground of ahistorical thinking there does not exist the possibility of stating dynamic goals, that is, actions directed toward changing the existing situation. One can set only static goals, what automatically (dogmatically) reproduce the existing state of affairs. In this way a person equates himself somehow with nature, becomes a part of nature. History is something which brings changes, uncertainty, unhappiness. The history of mankind contains many examples of societies which went under because they developed philosophies which perpetuated timeless, dogmatic thinking, thinking which was not focused on changes.

"Generalizing, we shall state that historical thinking is dynamic thinking. A person who thinks historically possesses awareness of the possibility of changes and when acting takes into consideration the historically-shaped situation. This type of thinking and acting is so very characteristic of the European situation that we are not too cognizant of this. Just as we do not constantly think about our breathing, for example, we do not focus constantly on the awareness that we think in historical terms.... This is not, however, an automatic ability; there exist degrees of ability to think historically. In this context the statement that the better historical education is, the more dynamic action becomes is a truism.

"History teaches dynamic thinking. This is a fundamental didactic value, although it is not always perceived. The degree of fulfillment of this didactic value through the teaching of history of course depends on what kind of historical science is conveyed to the students. The form of historical science, however, also determines to equal degree other didactic values. These are, first and foremost, the teaching of general thinking, accustoming to monothetic thinking, as well as deepening of the content of societal affairs."

Emphasized in the discussion on the problems raised in the above papers and report was the social as well as the philosophical function of history (Prof Dr Jozef Lubowicz, Prof Dr Wacław Długoborski); the need of honest historiography was pointed out (Prof Dr Tadeusz Jedruszczak), as well as the necessity of correct construction of the people's historical self-knowledge (Prof Dr Jarema Maciszewski).

Controversy Over History Curriculum

The course of research and debate over the study of history in the future 10-year school as well as the main theses of future actions in this area were presented on the second day of the conference by Doc Dr Jerzy Maternicki, who informed the assemblage that as a result of deliberations by a special 38-person curriculum team, consisting of scholars from the University of Warsaw as well as other higher educational institutions, from the Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences, personnel from the Institute of School Curricula as well as practical teaching specialists, another draft curriculum was hammered out, taking into consideration in large measure the demands from the nationwide debate which had been going on. It was especially necessary to abbreviate things in order to fit the material into the provided number of hours. Controversial items which Doc Dr Jerzy Maternicki presented for the consideration of the conferees included the following: the place and role of history in the 10-year school, the content of historical education (broadening of the history of culture, introduction of demographic problems, restoration of regional history), the proportion of general history and history of Poland, as well as the structure of the curriculum (detailed as well as general curriculum). At the same time, replying to some apprehensions pertaining to these items, brought up in the course of the debate, Doc Dr Jerzy Maternicki stated, among other things, that in the concern that the history of culture not be transformed into a catalog of events and names, the history teacher should not so much discuss the phenomena in this area as integrate knowledge learned from other subjects (Polish language, fine arts) and endeavor to place it in a concrete historical context. Also necessary is elaboration of commentary for the teacher, pertaining to implementation of curriculum in the area of introducing demographic problems as well as regional and local history, in order to avoid the danger of inappropriate discussion of these matters by teachers, such as burdening the pupils down with excessive statistics.

Research methodology as well as progress on draft curricula for the 10-year secondary school were presented by Doc Dr Stanislaw Frycie, director of the Institute of School Curricula. Adapting to the demand which has been frequently voiced in the debate, in the matter of increasing the number of hours of history in the 10-year school, Director Frycie stated that this is not possible in view of the already substantial student work load. Director Frycie also stated that the history curriculum continues to be of an open nature. It will also be improved in the course of initial curriculum adjustments -- with a two-year lead in relation to adoption of the reform -- in selected test schools.

During the debate on the content of the history curriculum, a large majority of the conferees spoke out in favor of giving priority to Polish history (including Prof Dr Jan Zarnowski), in view of the great indoctrinational value of this history. Views were divided, however, on the curriculum structure. Historical scholars as a rule felt that curricula

should not be too detailed, because historical science is constantly evolving (this view was also expressed by Doc Dr Waclaw Urban), while practical history teachers were in favor of a particular, detailed curriculum, in view of the differing area specializations of teachers (Mgr Wanda Fuksa).

The conferees also drew attention to the fact that up to the present time too little attention has been devoted to the forming of historical culture and historical thinking in school pupils (Dr Janina Tazbirowa) and to the necessity of personification of history -- a lack of national heroes from the labor movement (Dr Janusz Rulka). The apprehension was expressed that the new history curriculum might not be adapted to the perceptual capabilities of the pupils (Doc Dr Waclaw Urban), and doubt was also expressed that graduates of the 10-year school -- in view of the reduced period of schooling -- would be better prepared than graduates of the present liceum.

Teacher Training

A basic factor which will determine actual implementation of the new curriculum and thus success of the reform will be teacher qualifications. The conferees were informed about the personnel situation in this area by Doc Dr Jerzy Myslinski, Vice-Director of the Institute of Teacher Training. It follows from the figures presented that in the 1975/76 school year there were 11,535 teachers employed in primary, general-curriculum secondary as well as trade schools for whom history was the principal subject. Of this total, 6,239 persons had received advanced training (master's degree) or special professional training (Higher Teachers School), while 4,387 teachers possessed semi-higher education (Education Curriculum), and 869 teachers (in primary schools) had received only secondary training in education. A disturbing fact is that history was also being taught by Polish studies specialists (400 persons), education specialists (approximately 200), geographers (approximately 170) and even mathematicians (approximately 70).

What is the prognosis in the area of meeting personnel needs for the 10-year secondary school? It follows from the introductory points that up to 1984 the number of teachers with higher education will be approximately 10,400. And yet the planned number of hours for history in the 10-year secondary school will require approximately 11,000 teachers with higher education, and this forecast does not include history teachers in two-year specialized schools, a large number of whom must have a doctorate. Thus we project a future shortage of history teachers with higher education, particularly in view of the fact that many historians employed in the school system perform administrative tasks.

One problem which was subjected to lively debate at the conference was the present and future shape of history studies. Many speakers pointed

to the considerable work loading on present history students -- following reduction of the term of studies to four years -- caused by overloading the curriculum, which does not allow for more independent study and rumination. Attention was also drawn (Prof Andrzej Maczak) to the excessively large number of education science exercises, to the detriment of practical activities, in which the students are more interested and which are of greater benefit to them. In order to meet this demand it would be necessary to establish practice schools. This view was also expressed by Undersecretary Prof Dr Janusz Gorski, who stated that the basic training profile in history studies should be a teaching profile. Responding to demands to return to five-year history studies, Prof Dr Janusz Gorski stated that this is not possible at the present time, in view of the organizational conditions and facilities at higher schools, as well as education needs (extending studies by one year would make it necessary to reduce by 20 percent the number of students enrolled in the first year).

In this context Prof Dr Benon Miskiewicz drew an interesting picture of future history studies. "Social development demands of historians, as indoctrinators and teachers, more than conveyance of once-acquired knowledge, which has only been brushed up, for the most part randomly. We must produce graduating history majors who are prepared for continuous study, for increasing their qualifications. Then they will be in conformity with the new stage of development of our society, which demands that historians be teacher-indoctrinators as well as research scholars. The history studies curriculum at higher educational institutions should conform to these social requirements....

"...Up to the present time there has been prevalent in higher education in People's Poland an education model which sought to shape the profile of the history major as a research scholar, with a certain diminishing of the historian as a teacher. And yet teaching skills are not in a state of opposition to research skills; they substantially supplement and enrich one another. Making the historian into a teacher should also occur not with the assistance of various special classes but primarily through seminar activities within the framework of major subjects....

"...I am in favor of a future open program of history studies, being continuously improved and moving closer to satisfying the needs of an advanced socialist society.... Studies at a higher educational institution should stress independent study by the student. The principal goal of the higher educational institution, however, would be to have studies supported by accompanying research activities by school faculty. The purpose of this would be primarily to show how we form knowledge of history and how one acquires methods skills in the area of reconstituting the process of history. In this respect the higher educational institution will become a scholarly research laboratory for teachers and students, and its activities will be based on teaching and indoctrination through scholarly activities. This would at the same time help make students active and would be of fundamental importance for ideological influence."

Textbooks and Teaching Aids

Good textbooks are also a condition for proper implementation of curriculum. Attention was drawn time and again to this fact by the conferees, who did not too highly praise current school textbooks (Prof Marian Biskup, among others). Many individuals (among others, Prof Gerard Labuda, Mgr Wanda Fuksa) pointed to the necessity of preparing two or three textbook versions for each class, containing diversified source texts, as well as a teacher's manual.

Equally unsatisfactory is the situation as regards providing schools with history teaching aids. There is a lack of recordings, historical games, folio- and phasograms, and didactic films. Schools are also poorly supplied with such a fundamental means of teaching history as maps (there is a total lack of maps of some historical eras), and reproductions suitable for hanging on the wall (these facts were mentioned by Doc Dr Janusz Rulka and by Dr Janina Tazbirowa, principal of the M. Rej Liceum in Warsaw, plus others). In the opinion of Doc Dr Adam Suchonski from the Krakow Higher School of Education, who is conducting studies in this area, television broadcasts on historical subjects for viewing in schools are incompetently prepared.

Summary of the Debate

Statements appropriate to the debate were made by Jerzy Kuberski, Minister of Education, and by Prof Jarema Maciszewski, chief of the Science and Education Division of the Central Committee of the PZPR.

Minister Kuberski drew attention to the fact that the speakers in the debate, in discussing difficulties in implementing the curriculum of the 10-year secondary school, view it in an isolated manner. They fail to consider the fact that the curriculum in the 10-year school will be preceded by at least one year of preschool, and also that after completing the 10-year school the majority of students will continue studies in a two-year specialized school, in which they will continue studying history (in all types of schools, including trade schools). Also of significance is the fact that the school of the future will teach how to study, introducing the pupils -- to a greater degree than up to the present time -- to independent study.

Prof Dr Jarema Maciszewski, summarizing the proceedings, stated that the debate over draft 10-year school curricula had been very comprehensive and useful. Statements made both by practical teachers and by research scholars have been characterized by a feeling of responsibility connected with the drafted reform, which can be compared only with the reform of the Public Education Commission. The draft history curriculum which has just been presented received the approval of the majority of the participants in the debate. Professor Maciszewski emphasized that the basis of the reform will be the achievements of education up to the present time,

while a decisive role in the future school will continue to be played by the teacher. The chief of the PZPR Central Committee Science and Education Division ended his address with the statement that history is now and will continue to be one of the main instruments of social education.

Place of History Discussed

Warsaw PERSPEKTYWY in Polish 5 Nov 76 p 18

[Article by Katarzyna Z. Kolodziejczyk: "A Place for History"]

[Text] The great debate over the future form of universal public education is entering the final stage. Decisions defining the character of the future 10-year school are almost ready. The teaching of history will occupy an unusually important place in this school, which will form the basis of education of future generations of Poles.

A nationwide conference of historians organized by the Main Administration of the Polish Historical Society, held in Kalisz, dealt with the place and role of history in the future 10-year school, its curriculum, cognitive and indoctrinational content. The task at hand was to evaluate history curriculum proposals drafted by the Institute of School Curricula as well as by the staff of the University of Warsaw Institute of History.

To gain an idea of the breadth of the nationwide debate and the importance the conferees attached to correct formulation of a curriculum, it suffices to state that we are presently considering the fourth curriculum variant. As regards the debate in Kalisz, in my opinion its most valuable element was the fact that problems of curriculum provided an occasion for much broader statements: the conferees brought up such important questions as the role and place of history in the contemporary world and its values in man's adaptation to societal life in the period of a scientific and technological revolution, in indicating the genesis of the modern day and in facilitating an understanding of this present day, in forming productive and humanistic attitudes, in short, in everything which enables us to expect of citizens a patriotic, active and committed attitude toward their country.

The Polish language and history must constitute in the future 10-year school the foundation of the indoctrination and education about which Minister of Education Jerzy Kuberski most appropriately stated: "This school should be a school in which one will learn how to study." It would seem that in this situation all proposals aimed at minimizing the number of hours allocated for history -- and there are voices in favor of this -- must be vigorously rejected. In other words, if following all the debate there takes shape a curriculum which is acknowledged to be appropriate, the number of class hours should be adjusted to the curriculum, but never the other way around.

An erroneous opinion has become widespread that we teach history in school in order to teach young people the most important facts and phenomena of the past. It is true that history is comprised of facts; one can say that they comprise the basis of knowledge, but that which we wish to teach is not a collection of facts or dates but rather the teaching of an understanding of the historical process and a stage on the way to the final objective, which is teaching of historical thinking. Professor Jerzy Topolski formulated it in this manner: "Historical thinking is dynamic thinking. The individual who thinks historically possesses awareness of the possibility of changes, and when acting he takes into consideration the historically-formed situation." Precisely this is the fundamental didactic value of history. As if replying to the question of why bother with history, Professor Gerard Labuda stated: "...It is simply that knowledge of historical reality is much more complicated than that with which physicists deal and than that with which biologists deal."

The authors of draft curricula and the participants in the debate posed several very important questions. In a brief formulation, we can state them as follows: history, but what kind of history? Let us consider the question: what should the proportions be between Polish history and general history?

In the final version of the curriculum these proportions were approximately 3:2 in favor of general history. The authors of this proposal were intending in this manner to create extensive possibilities of comparative treatment of Polish history by placing the Polish historical process within the context of general historical changes. Both opinions within the teaching community and some voices raised in the debate at the conference pointed to the danger of twisting proportions to the detriment of Polish history. Such a danger does exist and, in my opinion, if there is a need to eliminate some portions of the curriculum material, it should not be Polish history, for Polish history must remain the most important component of history education.

The next important problem is how to present Polish history. Has history been presented correctly in the past? It has been a martyr's history -- "how they beat us," and it has been a victor's history -- "how we beat others." In this context Professor Maciszewski correctly observed that we must depart from alternative presentation of Polish history: either the picture was pessimistic, or it was optimistic, either a model of a battle, or of organic work, either state, or people. In teaching curricula, and particularly in the execution of curricula, we must choose a synthetic model, presenting the continuity of generations and at the same time continuous development. We must show that the Poland of today suffers from the results of the past, in which all elements were interlaced: combat and labor, sword and intellect, brilliance and shadow.

The excessively critical presentation of Polish history which we experienced up until recently led to a situation which was dramatically

illustrated by Doc Rulka. He conducted a questionnaire survey with the following question: how do young people evaluate the success and prosperity of individual periods in Polish history? The result was that the Golden Age, for example, was in no better than fifth place. Or take another example. More than 400 secondary school graduates, assessing Poland between the world wars, considered as a positive element only the fact that Poland arose. Are we not in this manner adding one more element to the aggregate of Polish complexes?

And finally, a most important problem, evoking the greatest controversy. Should the history curriculum in the 10-year school be ambitious or realistic? Ambitious means extensive, utilizing the latest achievements of historical science and education science, demanding of the pupil, but also of the teacher, and perhaps primarily of the latter, a great effort in its implementation. Realistic means taking as a point of departure the existing conditions in our education system, which do not promote achievement of the former. We are preparing a curriculum for educating Polish citizens, the majority of whom will be active in the twenty-first century; why should we deprive them of the opportunity to acquire knowledge at the highest level possible to attain? Such a level will ensure adoption of the maximum-ambitious curriculum. We know that there still exist large disproportions between the biological development and intellectual level of children and young people in the village and in large urban centers, that the level of schooling is not uniform, and finally that teacher qualifications vary, but will we not be equalizing these disproportions by lowering the level of education? There is no justification for equalization downward. Also unconvincing is the argument that it would be better to implement a minimum curriculum but one which is uniform across the board and "enforced with rigid consistency." This view is particularly dangerous since the same argument is being used in regard to other school subjects.

Of course execution of ambitious education curricula will require considerable expenditures; as history teaches, however, this money is one of the best possible investments. The problem of suitable textbooks, adapted to such a curriculum, urgently requires resolution, and there is need for an extensive volume of teaching aids and appropriate training of teachers. In the matter of textbooks -- of which, as we know, there are not enough for all pupils -- there is agreement that it is essential for pupils to have a selection of at least two for each class. Teachers also should have a separate textbook designed specifically for their courses. As regards teaching aids, a detailed discussion here would make this article into a listing of deficiencies. We must note, however, that such matters as utilization of maps, atlases or source publications should today be considered self-evident, and we should emphasize that the 1980's and beyond will be a period of universal utilization of film, recordings, slides, history games, and eventually video recordings.

Finally we come to the last item -- teachers. The question of the status of teachers, particularly financial, is a separate problem. We must recognize that those factors which cause a negative selection of profession are far from being eliminated. And yet we must agree with the statement that the future school will be determined in the final analysis by the teacher; it will be determined by the degree to which the teacher will have the proper working conditions and opportunity. There exists today the problem of academic training of history teachers for the 10-year school. University history faculty are criticized for training young historians more to be future scholarly researchers than teachers. And yet the ratio is such that only a few percent of history majors will take jobs in scholarly research, while the first employment for the rest will be in the schools. The academic community draws attention to another problem: the time allocated for the history curriculum at the higher level. It is four years at the present time, while in the past it was five years. It is practically impossible to fit in the entire former curriculum, and yet these students are going to be teachers in the future 10-year school. The problem reduces to the following: should the curriculum be altered (a worse solution), or should the term of studies be extended? This question has not yet been resolved.

The debate over history continues, while the question of history curriculum has not yet been resolved. It would seem essential that the history community not lose sight of professor Stefan Kieniewicz's most appropriate statement: "If our statements on the subject of Polish history prove to be dictated not by a passing fad, by opportunism, personal rancor or ambition, if they are not dictated by the desire for popularity or career, but represent genuine concern for our country -- only then can we hope that our words will reach people's hearts and conscience."

The above statement touches on problems which go far beyond the boundaries of history; they apply to the aggregate of problems called public education, the true value of which is best encompassed by the folk saying: "He who thinks a year ahead plants grain; he who thinks a hundred years ahead plants trees; he who thinks of the future of generations teaches children."

8817

CSO: 2600

'STEAUUA' LITERARY REVIEW COMPARES FORMALISM, FORMULISM

Cluj-Napoca STEAUUA in Romanian Dec 76 pp 2, 3

[Article by Eugen Uricaru: "Formulism and Formalism; Findings"]

[Text] Each literary period has its own temptations. At one time, physiology represented the peak of social and artistic accomplishment, with the author always being aware of his political mission and responsibility to the people, even if the relationship could be simplified to the point of author-readers. To discover the typical individual meant having the proof of the power of selection that resides in each artist. The theory of the representative type and the typical man appeared precisely in the period when physiology was the queen of the species. What about today? Today, when physiology remains a favored thing and when the writer has not only the temptation but also the need to view things overall, does physiology remain in the same regal position? Probably yes, since criticism urges that we move to a reflection upon the general through the particular. The water has flowed between the banks while the river has remained the same. Contemporary literature, especially prose, offers the spectacle of struggle for the establishment of the preeminence of the typical person, without that person also being representative. The youth, brought up on books and not on amber, are trying to interpret the ambitions of the creators, knowing all too well that their works are on the "edge" of my reality and of those who are trying hard to make it more understandable to me than it is. This reality, built on the basis (I prefer "edge") of controllable reality, is uncontrollable, having as a compensation a fundamental property--veracity. Good literature is truthful, even if it is not true. I said "even if" since this syntagm hides or preserves a chance, that of contradiction. One can also note: good literature is truthful, even if it is true. This statement is the closest thing to reality. The world of the bee is totally different from that of a tiger and yet they live together. And it is clear that the bee will never succeed in imposing its point of view (read this literally) upon the tiger since the moment the tiger accepts it, it will disappear as a species. One might say, extremely convincingly, that the conclusion in the above observation cannot be applied to the relationship established

between literature and society and artistic creation cannot radically influence the data of human existence so as to bring about a modification of its parameters. We can accept, in principle, the righteousness of this rule, noting the presence of exceptions. "The Sufferings of Young Werther" had its influence upon certain patterns at the micro-group level. "Emil, or about Education" or "Julie, or the New Eloise," by J. J. Rousseau, succeeded in clearly delineating the European concept regarding inter-human relationships and the rapport between Man and Nature. These works had unexpected echoes in our times, but they are nothing more than true exceptions without a major echo. In exchange, one can note events which, in their own way, have influenced the existence of certain civilizations. The first, considered through a permitted extension of the term literature, refers to a mythical practice from the days of the Pharaoh in Egypt, or more precisely at the time of the so-called introduction of iron. The orientalist Constantin Daniel analyzes this subject in a chapter of the exceptional work "Orientalia Mirabilia" and the causes and the results of this foreign intervention which, in the end, led to the fall of ancient Egypt. It says "the appearance of certain new technologies during a given historical period is in relation to the numerous religious and magical beliefs which can speed or, on the contrary, impede their propagation. Since the Iron Age appears in Egypt a millennium later, as the wheel did not appear in the Aztec and Inca civilizations because of religious and magical beliefs which impeded technological progress, these beliefs gave this civilization another course in history." The origin of this intervention can be found in the fact that the ancient Egyptians had a profound repulsion for all things that they supposed belonged to Seth. Those objects and animals under Seth's protection had a reddish color, like the god. Many things belonged to Seth: "fire, the desert sands, foreign countries, blood, onions (whose skin turns dark brown when cooked), red-haired (and blond) people, brown mules, and the dark-brown bull, and so forth. And, nearly all iron ores have a reddish color and due to this color are easily recognized. Up above, on the surface of the iron, rust appears which is also red and similar to dried, clotted blood--an element which also belongs to Seth. Also, when iron was first important it came from afar, in other words, from Seth's countries. All of these things at once led to the conclusion that Seth's possession of iron was an obvious thing for the Egyptians, especially if one was to think about and reflect upon the fact that iron helped in the making of arms, the instruments of war and death. And, likewise, Seth was a violent god and an assassin" (C. Daniel, op. cit., p 22). Thus, to a great degree, the destiny of a powerful state and a developed civilization was determined by an element of its own invention and a system of symbols and archetype literature. The most surprising literary event, however, is one which was the cause of a profound "mutation" in the mentality of Europeans. This was the appearance of the chivalrous love story which meant, at that moment, a true shock for the nature of inter-personal relationships that were still based upon the ancient Greek and Roman concepts or, at the best, Alexanderist concepts. Love, understood as a feeling of "desire," was defined for the first time, as the reputed specialist in the field Denis de Rougemont maintained, in the novels

such as "Tristan and Isolde." This new notion generated a new emotion, having extremely important implications in the social life of Europe. These chivalrous novels cultivated, spread, and carried forward this ethical-moral discovery, in its own European Middle Ages. Love, in this meaning, was, it would appear, unknown in antiquity and similarly unknown to the oriental peoples. The repercussions of this "invention" are known. Essentially, all of these factors are nothing but illustrations of the subtle interdependence between the base and the elements of the superstructure.

I was saying that physiology was the favorite of literary conscience in the last century. What is the authoritarian source today, because in its use and power we will find the opportunities of today's literature? Certainly, the answer is the novel. The opportunities of the novel to raise the valences of physiology to a higher level are obvious and from this point we can understand its social attraction. The ways in which it can provide answers are diverse and depend, primarily, upon the understanding that the author has of social phenomena and upon the capacity of the novel to intuitively determine the true sense of the real processes of development of the humanity to which it belongs. It so happens, and not infrequently, that certain novelists consider their work to be an example of real participation in the development of society, a courageous act, through "formulist" illustration (using the term of the Mexican artist D.A. Siqueiros). Formalism should not be confused with formalism, although the later term has some overlap in literary deontology.

In recent years, our literature has come through the process of certain real implications in the major problems of social life and has been marked by profound revolutionary changes designed to create constantly improving conditions in the multilateral affirmation of the structural model of human awareness and behavior.

One can affirm, however, that alongside the truthful reflections of these realities one encounters, in addition to certain "sure" solutions, not cliches but what we could call "formulistic" manifestations that can especially be found in the fields of prose and drama and through which they try to resolve the socio-literary problems but actually distort the basic problems. We are not referring to those works of that period when opting for "a final light" bestowed a certificate of value upon the work, but to those literary works which "propose" (apparently) to reflect their facts. Looking back from today, at the end of 1976, we find, not surprisingly, the publication in appreciable numbers of certain books which create experiences and conditions on the "edge" of the real facts of life. Some of them will appear in the form of a novel (or a play) in which a politician suffered an injustice during a given time period when he was passing through a serious experience in life and this wrong conferred upon him the right to resort to the same type of power and the authority to pass judgement. The politician can be replaced in the story by the intellectual who, due to a change in his opinion (typical), can become the victim of certain errors, with the process developing in an identical

manner. One can then define the means of the abuse of power in different sectors of activity--research institutes, hospitals, enterprises--where, because of certain events, the superior is undermined by the subordinates or vice versa and is then frustrated by the rights that they have (talents, scientific independence, human liberties). Historical themes are presented by certain authors who are in the "prophet" category in works in which the characters speak allusively and where they are always capable of clearly seeing the course of history in a secular perspective. The youth assume their responsibilities (in those works dealing with their lives) and their risks in their struggle against the routine, in a sure, conservative manner, which protects the hierarchies. These events take place at work sites, in outdated factories which are in need of technological changes, and in some reckless moment or, more frequently, at some isolated weather station. Certainly, one could find several similar settings--youngsters lacking ideals, older people too dedicated to social life, the incapable but clever and demagogic director, the disoriented artist, and so forth. But, this inventory of characters is not what is important. It is the question: What use does it have? After all, everything can be classified and labeled correctly as either a cliché or a formula. Even that which is neither--naming them formulae lacking a formula. The answer is also a question: are these formulae correct and typical or are they born of a need to "invent" an interesting conflict so as to avoid a careful, but tiring, observation of the realities in which the conflicts exceed the level of interest and become real and dramatic? Formalism is that which avoids conflicts and formalism substitutes for them, inventing other artificial conflicts and, more or less, arriving at a point of creating false pictures of reality--pictures which, sooner or later, exercise their influence on life. So, regarding the effect of literary images upon the manner of viewing life, I have tried to write the above points.

At the beginning, we were speaking of physiology and these formulae are in fact physiological factors, not of the typical individual but of the typical situations. We judge an era according to the dimensions of physiology and we will evaluate the present in accordance with the dimensions of a formula, speaking literally, naturally. It is probably a false problem, but its existence can be disturbing. I read, in a book (naturally), that not a single one of the statisticians who put together the classifications of the welfare of nations has been able to establish a coefficient for the level of happiness of each inhabitant of a nation. In order for literature to be viable, it must concern itself with the problems of life. This fact leads me to hope that literature knows how to pass between the Scylla and Charybdis noted in the title. Tristan and Isolde remind us that its responsibility is too great.

8724

CSO: 2700

YUGOSLAVIA

KARDELJ DISCUSSES COMMUNIST PARTY'S POLICY DURING UPRISING

Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2040 GMT 23-25 Feb 77 AU

[First installment of article by Edvard Kardelj, member of the SFRY Presidency and member of the LCY Presidium, to be published by KOMUNIST on 28 February under the title "The Political and Military Strategy of the National Liberation Uprising and Socialist Revolution in Yugoslavia and Tito's Creative Role in Its Planning and Realization," written in connection with Marshal of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito, president of the Republic and supreme commander of the SFRY armed forces, being awarded the first degree of Doctor of Military Sciences in the Center of High Military Schools on 21 December 1976--embargoed until 1800 GMT on 27 February 1976]

[Excerpts] I. Social-Historical Essence of the Revolutionary Strategy and Tactics of the Yugoslav Communist Party

The political strategy of the Yugoslav Communist Party on the eve of World War II and in our national liberation struggle and socialist revolution was the starting point and a component part of its military strategy and vice versa. Success in implementing the political strategy determined whether we would have an army to realize our overall strategic concept of the National Liberation Army. For, it is erroneous if one thinks that only patriotism and the patriotic part of the platform of the National Liberation Movement were sufficient for the masses of fighters voluntarily to take up arms and to go off to war. The vast majority of people was really very patriotically inclined and ready for a struggle against the occupier. However, this great mass patriotic movement had, in addition to a national component, also class, socioeconomic, political-ideological, cultural and other social components, and carried within itself certain contradictions and acute and potential conflicts. The Yugoslav Communist Party leadership would have been politically naive and would have quickly lost the battle had it not taken account of all these components, or rather had it limited itself only to a pragmatic guiding of the uprising.

1. Vital Elements of Our Political and Military Strategy

The political and military strategy of the Yugoslav Communist Party on the eve of World War II and in our national liberation struggle had to take into account the following vital elements in particular:

First, that it is impossible to develop the national liberation war, or rather the uprising and war and to win a victory over the occupier without a conscious and voluntary participation of the basic strata of people in this war, that is, without the participation primarily of workers, peasants and democratic intelligentsia.

Second, that in the National Liberation Front, in its political platform and in the system of the new people's authority, which began to be created on the liberated territory, it was necessary that primarily the interests of these basic strata of the people had to be expressed.

Third, that the participation of the basic people's masses in the national liberation war and the creation of the new people's authority which expressed the interests of these basic strata of the people necessarily led to a close linkage, or rather to an intertwining of the national liberation war with the socialist revolution.

Fourth, that the peoples and nationalities of Yugoslavia were prepared to unite themselves in a unified national liberation uprising only under the condition that this would create a prospect and give a guarantee that Yugoslavia would be a state of free and equal peoples and nationalities.

Fifth, that to raise the people to such an uprising it was indispensable to have a broad liberation-patriotic, democratic and socially progressive political and ideological platform as was expressed precisely by our National Liberation Front.

Sixth, that under such conditions the leading role of the Yugoslav Communist Party, both in the National Liberation Front and in the national liberation war itself, was indispensable as the basic factor for the victory of our national liberation war and for such a revolutionary development because only the party was organizationally capable and had the cadres to organize and lead the uprising, and at the same time it was a guarantee for the revolutionary masses of the people that new Yugoslavia would be different from the old one.

Any other policy which would take account of these factors would practically mean a closing of prospects for the broad people's masses regarding a change in the character of political and social relations in Yugoslavia and thus destruction of unity of the people and the National Liberation Front, and this would, in fact, only prepare a defeat of the national liberation uprising, or rather it would reduce it to the most elementary forms of the so-called resistance movement.

Tito was deeply aware that in such a historic movement as our national liberation uprising political and military strategy are absolutely mutually dependent. Tito has never been only a soldier without simultaneously being also a politician. And he has never been only a politician without simultaneously being also a soldier.

And, Tito has always been a revolutionary and a realist. Tito was aware that the results of our party's policy did not depend on nicely formulated proclamations and resolutions, regardless of the fact that it was also necessary to take account of this. Tito proceeded primarily from the fact that only that policy, or rather that political and military strategy, can be considered good and successful which really provides concrete results in the struggle for such a relationship of power between the social and political forces which will develop to the benefit of the National Liberation Movement, and this objectively led--although we never stressed this--to a strengthening of the leading role of the democratic and socialist revolution.

The conflict with the leading forces of old Yugoslavia, therefore, did not result from an a priori ideological or political stand of the Yugoslav Communist Party, but rather because these forces were not prepared to fight against the occupier and to this end to agree with the National Liberation Front. And because of their fear for their class and hegemonistic interests their force chose precisely the occupier as their ally in the struggle against the people's democratic demands. In such a situation the Yugoslav Communist Party's leadership was directed even more toward building such a political platform which would be the closest possible to the long-term democratic, social and other interests of the people's masses and which would enable it at a given moment to rally the broadest masses of the people in the National Liberation Movement. However, at the same time the party also pursued such a practical policy which in this movement had constantly strengthened the movement's vanguard and progressive nucleus because only this nucleus could insure both the continuity of the national liberation struggle as well as the final victory of the democratic and socially progressive social forces, that is, to insure such a victory with which the people's masses which were the protagonists of the national decision making on the final social and political character of new Yugoslavia.

We communists were deeply convinced that because of all this the result of the victorious national liberation uprising would be a socialist revolution. True, we did not stress this goal as a direct goal of the national liberation uprising itself. However, we expected and we fought so that the national liberation uprising should create the revolutionary and democratic conditions under which the revolutionary people's masses could decide in favor of such a historic step. However, although the socialist revolution was not our direct goal in the national liberation uprising itself, we were aware that certain of its revolutionary-democratic and social aspects should become the condition for strengthening the uprising and that the revolution causes, prepares and encourages a whole number of factors in the national liberation war itself. The following among these factors were particularly stressed: National treason of old Yugoslavia's leadership; the social and political structure of the National Liberation Movement which came about, among other things, as a result of a lack of readiness of the leading political forces of old Yugoslavia to fight against the occupier; the revolutionary resistance of the peoples and nationalities of Yugoslavia against every thought of renewing the old system of hegemony

and national oppression; and the leading political and organizational role of the Yugoslav Communist Party in the national liberation uprising which was not ready to capitulate before the treacherous leaders and representatives of the forces of the Yugoslav Exile Government in London.

However, in all this neither Tito nor the leadership of our party were infallible. There were mistakes and failures in this policy. Nonetheless, the essential thing is that these failures were never so big and fateful as to threaten our National Liberation Movement and the socialist revolution. Besides, on the basis of the experience gained, we quickly corrected such failures.

2. The National Liberation Front and the Role of the Yugoslav Communist Party in the National Liberation War

Although it was a component part of our political and military strategy in the national liberation uprising and throughout the entire national liberation war and revolution to insure and to realize the leading role of the Yugoslav Communist Party, the party never stressed this role as some kind of a right to monopoly in the political leadership of the National Liberation Movement. On the contrary, we fought for a broad and well-organized National Liberation Front, or rather Movement, capable of being a supreme decisive organ of the national liberation struggle. However, in the situation that arose with the national treason of leaders of old Yugoslavia the leading role of the party in this movement was the objective condition for its unity and action capability. For, it is completely clear that the National Liberation Movement could not originate, fight and develop spontaneously alone. Of course, there were also elements of spontaneity in the national liberation uprising, and this is only a sign of its true national character. However, such a spontaneous movement would be quickly reduced under the blows of the occupier had there been no initiating, organizing and leading force which strategically and tactically directed the activity of the movement as a whole. For this reason its development and its combat capability depended on the nature of the ideological, social and political forces. It is these forces which gave it its determining character.

Struggling for this structure of the National Liberation Movement and the National Liberation Front, the Yugoslav Communist Party at the same time formulated such a political platform of this movement and this front which every true patriot and democrat was able to adopt, that is, which could be adopted by anyone whose sense of responsibility for the fate of the freedom and independence of the Yugoslav peoples was not subordinated to any special ideological, class and political interests of his own and who, therefore, was not afraid of a liberation uprising of the armed people. It was on the basis of this platform that the Yugoslav Communist Party was ready to share and did share the responsibility for decision making with all political forces united within the National Liberation Front. Thus, the

leading role of the Yugoslav Communist Party was not any imposed status but rather an expression of its ability by its ideological and political influence and its action to organize large masses of the people and raise them to a national liberation uprising. The meaning and the substance of the concept of the leading role of the Yugoslav Communist Party lies precisely in its historical role. Nobody brought this role of the party on a platter nor did the party impose it by some kind of an ideological position of its own, but it rather won by its ability to become a successful and acknowledged leader and force of the people in a difficult historical struggle for their existence and freedom, the struggle in which the previous rulers betrayed them.

Naturally, the Yugoslav Communist Party did not impose on anyone who cooperated with the party within the National Liberation Front the condition that socialism had to be the aim of the national liberation uprising. The party, however, demanded that those who fought should be in a position after the war to decide freely about the character of the future Yugoslav society, and should be able to do this to a certain extent even during the national liberation war through the democratic and progressive social structure of people's rule in the liberated territory. We were deeply convinced that the very social and political structure of the National Liberation Front insured progressive historical solutions. For this reason we never agreed that the National Liberation Front should only be a kind of coalition of political parties or groups, and especially not an alliance with the leading structure of old Yugoslavia unlimited by any conditions. We were aware that this was unrealistic and that in such a case there would not have been a national liberation uprising.

3. Sociohistorical Causes of Internal Resistance to the National Liberation Uprising

National liberation resistance against the occupiers created a high degree of unity among the people despite certain ideological and political differences. However, the objective dialectics of class differences and differences created by the old system of oppression against the nations and nationalities did not automatically cease to exist. Practice very soon demonstrated that even during the war there was no "class peace."

[passage omitted describing National Liberation Army as consisting mainly of workers, peasants and democratic intelligentsia]

The peoples of Yugoslavia fought for their own liberation and, at the same time, for a new Yugoslavia in which the nations and nationalities would be free and equal. In this way the national liberation uprising against the occupier was objectively intertwined, as it had to be, with the democratic, national-liberation and socialist revolution. The national liberation uprising and the policy pursued by its leading forces, above all by the Yugoslav Communist Party, were aimed at opening up the prospect of liberating all of the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia from all forms of hegemony and national oppression, and, at the same time, opening up the prospect of

establishing a democratic rule of the people which would serve their democratic, class and social interests. Both of these aspects of the policy of the Yugoslav Communist Party and the National Liberation Front became evident during the war in the form of a growing system of people's rule in the liberated territory.

These aspirations of the people were opposed by social forces which had different class, social and political interests and aims. This was true of the ruling class and political structure of old Yugoslavia. However, the logic of the policy of protecting its class and hegemonist rule from the armed people who wanted changes meant that this political structure very soon reached the stage of open collaboration with the occupier. At first the Yugoslav Government in exile and other political and military supporters of these forces formally expressed a readiness to cooperate with the National Liberation Movement and the partisans, when we offered this to them. However, they set two major conditions: The first was that Tito and the National Liberation Army should recognize the supreme command of Draza Mihajlovic, meaning the Chetnik Supreme Headquarters, as their supreme command and act on decisions passed by this supreme command: And the second was that the rule of the national liberation committees should be liquidated in the liberated territory and the old system of administrative rule should be set up, meaning military rule which would in fact have been in the hands of Chetniks.

When Tito held talks with Draza Mihajlovic in 1941 about the joint struggle against the Germans, Draza Mihajlovic put precisely these conditions in the center of his demands. For the National Liberation Movement and partisan army, acceptance of these conditions would have meant accepting so-called "waiting" policy, together with all of its consequences. In other words, this would have meant giving up both the national liberation uprising and the interests and aims of the people who had taken up arms.

Consequently, Tito and the Yugoslav Communist Party were faced with the alternatives: Either to enter into a pact with the political forces of old Yugoslavia and thus give up the struggle against the occupier and every revolutionary goal demanded by the people when they joined the national liberation uprising; or to turn precisely to the people and pursue a policy which served them and thus create from among the people an army for the national liberation uprising. Naturally, Tito and the Yugoslav Communist Party decided on the second alternative. [passage omitted on the communist party starting an armed uprising and leading the people, over the opposition of some individuals]

Some Western historians still repeat Churchill's thesis, voiced soon after the war, that Draza Mihajlovic allegedly began fighting against the Germans in April of 1941 while we didn't begin until July of that year, and that Chetniks started collaborating with the Germans due to their clash with the partisans.

In fact, the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party decided at its session on 10 April 1941 in Zagreb that the struggle against the aggressor--meaning the occupier--should be continued regardless of the destiny of the kingdom of Yugoslavia and its army. [Passage omitted on uprising then being prepared in an organized way] Chetniks, however, with the exception of several spontaneous actions by some of their local peasant detachments in 1941, never waged an armed struggle against the occupier. On the contrary, Draza Mihajlovic not only did not wage an armed struggle against the occupier, but in the summer of 1941 he established contact with the Germans and Nedic and in October of the same year he held a meeting with them at Divci and offered to collaborate with them. [Passage omitted dealing with creation of people's rule on liberated territory]

On the basis of analyses of local conditions and on the basis of our political strategy, we created the national liberation councils through a delegate mechanism which enabled the people themselves to participate in the organs of power. In doing so we felt that the basic strength of these organs of power should lie in the people who were taking an active part in the national liberation uprising. This did not mean contrary to what certain historians now ascribe to us, that we were in favor of a confrontation between the poor and the rich, or in favor of a struggle in the countryside against the "kulaks." Many people from the bourgeois environment--in fact, from the wealthier strata--and even from among well-to-do peasants, were fighters in the National Liberation Movement. The opposite was also the case: There were poor peasants and workers who sided with those who collaborated with the occupier. We never divided the fighters of the National Liberation Movement according to their class or social strata. Instead, we judged people according to whether or not they were ready to fight the occupiers.

True enough, there were also manifestations of narrow sectarian types of approaches on the basis of the Stalinist "investigation" into social origin, but Tito and the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party constantly struggled against this kind of phenomenon. In fact, our basic orientation in this respect was: Struggle for every man, from whatever environment he came, if he was ready to fight the enemy. For this reason we were in favor of democratic rule by the people, which we built on that basis. The manner of electing delegates was set up to insure the greatest possible attention to the interests of the basic strata of the people, the main force in the National Liberation Movement and our National Liberation Army. This new people's rule represented the guarantee of a better future for the working people and thus became the mobilizing power of the national liberation uprising.

However, as both the responsible leaders of a liberation movement and Marxists, we had to analyze and realistically assess the situation at every individual stage of our struggle. The characteristic of the situation was that the enemy forces enjoyed support primarily in the bourgeois strata of the towns, among a large part of the church clergy, among "prominent"

well-to-do village farmers, and so forth. Therefore, it was natural and necessary to warn communists and national liberation war fighters to be vigilant against the political activities of these circles and against infiltration of the organs of people's rule by elements from these environments. After all, at the end of 1941 and in early 1942 it was these types of people who were among the main exponents and perpetrators of betrayal who were responsible for the slaughter of political commissars and communists in a number of peasant units which, largely influenced by the fall of the Uzice Republic, had gone over to the side of the Chetniks.

So then, the calls for vigilance were very necessary indeed. It is true that in practice this vigilance at times assumed some ugly forms, but this does not mean that it was not necessary. Tito and the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party always fought against distortions of that kind, striving to insure through vigilance that the basic course of the National Liberation Front's policy was never undermined.

Thus, it is quite clear why we kept stressing the need for the National Liberation Movement to rely primarily on the basic strata of the people. However, this does not mean that we followed any narrow class policy against the bourgeoisie, the kulaks, the old politicians, and so forth. On the contrary, we were ready to extend a hand to all those who wanted to fight together with us, or at least help the National Liberation Movement in some way. The Yugoslav Communist Party ceaselessly and persistently stressed the need for the broadest possible basis on which to build the National Liberation Movement. However, given the structure of the class, social, political and other interests, objectively we had to let the communists and other fighters in the National Liberation Movement know in which social structures they should seek support and in which structures they should expect to be betrayed and stabbed in the back.

On the other hand, we also had to bear in mind the need to formulate and present our policy in such a way that it would receive the broadest mass support. We also tried to win over certain strata of the patriotically inclined bourgeoisie and wavering sections of the intelligentsia to the National Liberation Movement, and those whom we could not win over we tried at least to neutralize. In brief, our aim was to reduce the conflict to a genuine conflict with the real enemy--the occupiers and those who were most directly associated with them. We also manifested this in regard to the Yugoslav Government in exile in London.

4. On the Peasants' Participation and Role in the National Liberation Uprising

Peasants played a very important role in our national liberation war. The views voiced in our country in assessing this role have been--and most likely still are--very divergent and range from the view that our liberation war was above all an uprising of our peasants to the view which completely underestimates their role in the war. However, neither of these assessments is in keeping with the facts.

By virtue of his social and cultural background, the peasant, generally, is a "conservator" of national awareness. He does not put up with alien rule and it is difficult to denationalize him, though his resistance does not always manifest itself in a revolutionary form. However, as a rule, peasants make up the armies or are the mainstays of the armies of the national liberation movements. Our peasants are also like this and this is how they behaved in World War II.

Peasants took part in our national liberation uprising in large numbers, either as fighters or as active supporters of the uprising. In some parts of Yugoslavia and in certain periods they constituted the majority of the fighters in the partisan detachments and in the National Liberation Army units. A large number of celebrated partisan commanders and popular heroes emerged from their ranks. Even when they were not active participants in the uprising, a large majority of the peasants either actively supported it, or by passively resisting the occupiers contributed considerably to the weakening of their military and political positions in occupied Yugoslavia. In this connection I shall only recall the surrender in large numbers of the Croat Home Guards--largely peasants--and their joining the partisan units; the Serbian peasants' passive resistance to the occupiers and the Chetniks after the German occupation of the Uzice and other free territories in Serbia; and the passive resistance by that part of the Moslem population in Bosnia and Hercegovina which took no active part in the national liberation war but which did not support the occupiers either, and so forth.

Naturally, the occupiers and the domestic enemies of the National Liberation Movement also had their own positions among the peasant ranks. In fact, the Quisling army was largely manned by peasants. However, this was nevertheless only a relatively small percentage compared with the majority of the peasants who either took an active part in the uprising or assisted it to a greater or lesser extent by their passive resistance to the occupiers. All of this was a manifestation not only of the peasants' resistance to the occupiers but also of the fact that the majority of the peasants, having lost all confidence in their former bourgeois leaders, had begun to turn their backs on them. [Passage omitted on attitude of peasants in Slovenia in fighting for their freedom]

It is true that the peasants' participation in the uprising in all parts of Yugoslavia fluctuated to a greater or lesser extent, mainly depending on the situation on the fronts of the national liberation uprising. However, the basic reaction of the majority of the peasants--that is, resistance to the occupiers and their collaborators--never changed.

One can also speak in similar terms about the role of the democratic intelligentsia in the national liberation war. By this I do not mean only the so-called left intelligentsia, but much wider circles with greater or lesser differences in ideological and political concepts. Students, cultural workers, physicians, teachers, officers of the old Yugoslav army,

priests and in general intellectuals from a great variety of professions were present in large numbers in the partisan detachments or in the system of people's rule in the liberated territory. Intellectuals took part together with workers in the underground struggle in the occupied territory and in giving various forms of support to the National Liberation Movement. Consequently, it may be said that the majority of the intelligentsia was on the side of the national liberation uprising either actively or through its passive resistance to the occupiers.

Some people have drawn the conclusion from all of this that our national liberation war was mainly a peasant war with the participation of intellectuals. In other words, that the peasants were the main motive force in that war and that they were--more or less spontaneously--organized by intellectuals and "prominent" village landowners. The enemies of socialism have even asserted that the national liberation uprising was a spontaneous action by peasants and the patriotic intelligentsia whom the communists, being better organized, exploited "for their own aims." However, whatever the extent and importance of the peasants' participation in the national liberation uprising and war, any significance for this participation could not even be imagined without the decisive role of the workers, who in great numbers and persistently both involved themselves in the uprising and supported it: Without the broad participation of the democratic intelligentsia, who brought their knowledge to the uprising; without the national liberation front, which united and directed the forces of the national uprising; and without the Yugoslav Communist Party as the leading ideological and organizing force. [Passage omitted on the uprising as the expression of the spontaneous will of the people's masses]

The essential aspect of the peasants' participation in the uprising was the fact that the working class and its vanguard, the Yugoslav Communist Party, were successful in forging ties with the peasants and involving them in the national liberation uprising. While the working class exercised its influence primarily through its mass participation in the uprising, which strengthened the belief in the success of the uprising among the peasants and intelligentsia, the Yugoslav Communist Party and the National Liberation Front were successful in this respect because they were following the policy which I have already mentioned--that is, a policy which corresponded to both the current and long-term interests of the peasants and the democratic intelligentsia. This policy showed the peasants and intelligentsia, first, that there were forces capable of leading a successful struggle for the country's liberation and, secondly, that the new Yugoslavia would be different from the old. That is, that it would correspond to their interests. They were able to see the practical proof of this already during the war, primarily in the popular character of the partisan army and in the self-managing character of the organs of people's rule.

The broadest people's masses, taught by the experiences of old Yugoslavia and by the national betrayal by their political leaders during the war, turned their backs on old Yugoslavia's political structure and sought new leading

social forces, capable not only of waging a successful struggle against the occupiers but also of fulfilling their expectations with regard to the character of the new Yugoslavia. They found these forces in the working class--that is, in the revolutionary workers movement and its vanguard, the Yugoslav Communist Party.

The rallying of the people's masses around this new leading social force was reflected in the structure of the National Liberation Movement and uprising. This, in addition to their readiness to fight the occupiers, was the second main reason for the mass participation of the peasants and democratic intelligentsia in the national liberation uprising.

5. The National Liberation Uprising and the Socialist Revolution

The leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party and National Liberation Front had to match its practical policy--that is, its political and military tactics--to objective historical process of structural changes in Yugoslav society, of which it was perfectly aware. It had to combine the national liberation political platform with the platform of the democratic, social aspirations of the people's masses, above all the working class, peasants and democratic intelligentsia.

The leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party had to be ready to face the political consequences of this process of structural changes in Yugoslav society--in other words, to ace the historically and objectively imposed class and political contradictions to which this process had given rise. It had to see in advance what social forces would be set in motion by this process against the National Liberation Movement. In the process of this, as I have already said, the individual accents of this policy could not always be identical in all directions--for instance, during the stages of the growth and advance of the national liberation uprising as well as during the stages of its retreat and defensive action. Similarly, the intensity and forms of struggle against the internal direct and potential enemies of the national liberation uprising could not always be the same. Thus there were certain differences in the National Liberation Movement's political slogans and in party guidelines at certain moments and stages of the struggle. Consequently, to understand the meaning of these differences, it is necessary to understand the strategic concept of the Yugoslav Communist Party and the National Liberation Front as a whole and comprehend the sociohistorical circumstances which conditioned this concept.

This was our course to which Tito made a decisive contribution through his understanding of the conditions of the struggle and his inspiration. When I look back today I am deeply convinced that without following such a course we would not have been able to involve the people's masses in the national liberation war. Workers, peasants and the democratic intelligentsia were the soldiers of our revolutionary army. If we had not pursued a policy which was in keeping with their aspirations we would not have had

these soldiers. Only a man devoid of any sense of historical reality can assert today that we were able to organize the movement which we organized and create the army which we created only because we adopted some petty political tactics in relation to old Yugoslavia's political leadership, which did not want an uprising. This very view was defended during the war, especially at the beginning of the uprising, by a number of opportunistically inclined people on the left who were afraid of the uprising.

Likewise, some individual historians still seem to think today that we pursue a "narrow class" or ideologically limited policy because we did not want to subordinate ourselves to the policy of those of Yugoslavia's former leaders. Those leaders behaved as if they were, ostensibly, the occupiers' enemies while in fact they opposed the armed struggle against the occupiers. In fact, they were trying to prevent any arming of the people not under their own control and thereby also any armed action by the people. With our policy we were extending a hand to and creating the conditions for full cooperation with these circles as well, naturally as long as they were willing to fight. The best proof of this is the Tito-Subasic agreement. However, we know that they did not want any of this. Consequently we orientated our entire policy above all toward the fighting people's masses in the National Liberation Movement. This precisely was the essence of the National Liberation Front in all the parts of Yugoslavia and of the leading role of the Yugoslav Communist Party.

If we view all these processes through the prism of long-term historical development, we can say that the socialist revolution and the struggle for national liberation in our national liberation war were intertwined in a specific historical movement which gave the working class full prominence and proved it as the leading force in the struggle for the national liberation of the peoples of Yugoslavia. In fact, our National Liberation Movement was the first movement in Europe which was not headed by the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois stratum, but by the working class in alliance with peasants, the democratic intelligentsia and other patriotic forces. By this our National Liberation Movement in practice rejected the Stalinist dogmatic concept of the national question as predominantly peasant or bourgeois-democratic question, because the problem of the nation and its freedom and independence equally represents the interest of the working class itself as of the other classes and strata of the people.

In this way our political practice also rejected the thesis which the Comintern and Stalin himself had for a considerable time been imposing on our party. They advocated the view that Yugoslavia would first go through a phase of the bourgeois-democratic revolution which would at the same time also solve the national question and that it would only then go through the phase of the socialist revolution. We rejected this thesis in effect, though not formally as well, because of our relations with the Cominform, already at the Fifth National Conference of the Yugoslav Communist Party held in Zagreb in 1940. Tito was already pointing out the need for the working class to become the leading force also in the struggle for the

national liberation of the peoples of Yugoslavia. In other words, already the Fifth National Conference of the Yugoslav Communist Party Proclaimed, in essence, the link between the national liberation struggle and the socialist revolution. This was the supposition on which we based our fundamental strategic political orientation in the days of the national liberation war as well.

II. The Realization and Victory of the Yugoslav Communist Party's Political and Military Strategy

The entire practical policy of the Yugoslav Communist Party and all its actions on the eve of and during the war were the result of this kind of political orientation. The only alternative to this strategy at the time was a pact with Yugoslavia's old political structure, but if we had accepted this strategy there would have been no National Liberation Movement. The victory of the national liberation war and the socialist revolution in Yugoslavia is undoubtedly the best proof of the correctness of the basic components of the political strategy to which Tito made the decisive creative contribution.

1. The National Liberation Uprising Movement

An integral, inseparable part of this strategy of the Yugoslav Communist Party was the way in which the national liberation uprising was started. Immediately after the collapse of the old regime in Yugoslavia and the occupation of the country, the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party, headed by Tito adopted the attitude and orientation in favor of organizing an armed uprising and was preparing the party for starting such an uprising as soon as the necessary general political conditions had been created. The Yugoslav Communist Party Central Committee appointed Tito as head of the entire system of military committees which were being created both in the party's base and at all the levels of the party organization up to the Yugoslav Communist Party Central Committee. They were to become not only the initiator of the National Liberation Movement, but also the direct exponent of the armed actions in the first stage of the uprising.

At that time many communist parties were confused because of the pact which Stalin had concluded with Hitler. Owing to this, some parties were deeply weakened and some had even abandoned the struggle against fascism. We understood Stalin's maneuvering as a necessity imposed by the contradictions and by the unresolved questions in the relations between the Western countries and the Soviet Union. However, we did not interpret this pact as a directive for the work of the Yugoslav Communist Party in the sense that fascism had ceased to be the main danger to the peoples of Yugoslavia. This was our attitude even before the fascist invasion of Yugoslavia. Before the invasion our attitude was against dragging Yugoslavia into the war and for a democratization of Yugoslavia which would express the will of the people and thereby strengthen Yugoslavia in opposing fascism and fascist imperialism. During the April War we gave active support

to the war effort for the country's defense. After the collapse of the Yugoslav Army in that war and the country's occupation the struggle against the occupiers became the main aim of the policy of the Yugoslav Communist Party leadership.

It was with this purpose in mind that at the Yugoslav Communist Party consultative meeting in May 1941 Tito outlined the concept of the liberation struggle against the occupiers, which should be the concern of the broadest people's masses and all the peoples of Yugoslavia, also outlining the concept of the sociohistorical content of this struggle.

During April, May and June 1941 the Yugoslav Communists were preparing, not only politically, but also organizationally and technically, to be the vanguard of the national liberation uprising the moment the people's masses were ready to rise, regardless of what decisions were to be taken by the political forces outside the National Liberation Movement. If we had then orientated ourselves toward a coalition with the political leaders of the old Yugoslavia regime and if we had waited for their approval of the uprising it is certain that there would have been no uprising.

When Hitler attacked the Soviet Union, we considered that the moment to start the armed uprising had come. Some of the critics of our policy said that we started the uprising at that time solely to help the Soviet Union. This is not true. We would have been adventurers if we had started the armed uprising for any political motives if the conditions had not been right for involving the broadest people's masses in such an uprising. It is true that as communists we considered it to be our duty to extend help to the first country of socialism and thus at the same time contribute to the creation and strengthening of a broad anti-Hitlerite coalition capable of dealing Hitler a death blow.

However, at the same time we also had in mind the following two facts: First, the masses understood that by the Soviet Union's entry into the war the fate of Hitlerite imperialism was sealed. This was a powerful encouragement to an increasing number of fighters to join the national liberation uprising. Second, the masses were disillusioned by the betrayal and opportunist behavior of Yugoslavia's former political structure both before and during the April War. As I have already said, they were looking for new political forces capable of organizing and leading the national liberation uprising. The people found these forces in the National Liberation Front. In other words, they found these forces in a movement which, headed by the Yugoslav Communist Party, already represented an influential political force at that time in all the parts of the country.

On 22 June 1941 I was in Ljubljana. A session of the Central Committee of the Slovene Communist Party was held the same day. At that session, though we had no contact with Tito, we passed the decision that the national liberation uprising should start immediately. At the same time we issued a proclamation which, in essence, represented a call to rise. This, however,

was not explicitly stated in the proclamation, since we were also awaiting the decision of Comrade Tito and the party leadership which then was, in other words whose seat then was in Belgrade. At this session we set up the general headquarters for Slovenia and issued orders turning all the military committees into partisan detachments' commands and instructing them to start armed actions the moment they had received instruction or orders from the general headquarters. Moreover, at this same meeting we decided what badges should be used on partisan uniforms which were virtually the same as those adopted on 4 July 1941 and later on by the supreme headquarters, with Tito at its head, though at that time we were not able to communicate. This incredible similarity was only possible because at that time all the communists in Yugoslavia were clear in their mind about the uniform strategy of the Yugoslav Communist Party and the National Liberation Front in connection with the preparations for the national liberation uprising. This is what is ridiculous about the efforts of individual people in the country and abroad, who are concerned with the history of our national liberation uprising, when they try to present this uprising as a spontaneous one and the policy of the Yugoslav Communist Party leadership as a pragmatic policy dictated by events.

The above-mentioned decision of the Slovene Communist Party Central Committee was adopted under the supposition that the Soviet Union's entry into the war with Hitler would create the conditions about which I spoke earlier, that is the kind of mood of the masses and thereby also the kind of conditions for the armed uprising which had been envisioned by Tito and the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party. The decision of the Yugoslav Communist Party Central Committee of 4 July 1941 proved the correctness of this assessment. Practice quickly showed the correctness of the assessment made at that time by the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party.

2. Tito's Concept of the Strategy and Tactics of the National Liberation Uprising and the Socialist Revolution

With reference to our military strategy, it seems to me that we do not yet possess an all-embracing analysis of this strategy in the light of the sociohistorical developments during the contemporary epoch and of the role played by Tito and the Yugoslav Communist Party in creating this strategy and implementing it creatively. I have the impression that in this respect some of the analysis are at times influenced by the projection into the past of the concepts and views developed later. There have even been periods during which some of these authors began to feel ashamed of the fact that during the national liberation war we were partisans and not a "regular army," and yet that was one of the greatest values of our national liberation uprising and revolution. Some of them tried at any price to prove that from the very start we had been some kind of regular army which was pursuing its policy, forgetting that in all the stages of its development the National Liberation Army was an army of national uprising and socialist revolution. In fact, in this case too the war was only the continuation of the policy by other means.

With regard to that which is valid for the state this is also valid for the policy of the revolutionary party. The war which the Yugoslav Communists set in train and waged represented the policy of the party and of the National Liberation Front waged by different means. By laying down the course of the alliance of workers, peasants and democratic intelligentsia in the national liberation war, we adapted, to use this expression, the revolutionary-military doctrine to this policy and to the concrete possibilities of waging a war under the conditions of uprising in an occupied country. Because, had we not adapted it we could not have been able to mobilize broad masses of the people for the war.

The characteristic of our national liberation struggle and that new feature with which it endowed the revolutionary process in Europe is the fact that in Yugoslavia the socialist revolution linked up for the first time and intertwined with the national liberation war. In saying this I have in mind the fact that that was the first time in Europe that a working class, led by its avant-garde, that is, the Communist Party, and in alliance with peasants and democratic intelligentsia emerged as the leading force of the national liberation war. And secondly, this war was waged in an occupied country of Europe without any reliance on external forces. Modest aid in weapons arrived at a time when our uprising had already been greatly advanced. More extensive aid came only in the final stages of the war. Both of these facts had to exert an influence on Tito's concept of the strategy and tactics of the national liberation uprising.

This concept contributed to the arsenal of military strategy and tactics of revolutionary struggle novelties which are not merely significant for us, but also for many other similar revolutionary movements in the world.

Tito proceeded from the political strategy of which I have already spoken as well as from the layout and the balance of power of forces which were in conflict. The classical theory of armed uprising to which the Comintern continued to adhere in the Second World War, as well as many communist parties, was under the influence of the armed struggles of the working class in the 19th century and particularly of the October Revolution. The substance of this concept consisted of the fact that the focal point of the armed uprising was in the towns and that this uprising, as a rule, should stem from strikes and demonstrations by workers. Relying on such concepts a considerable number of European communists criticized in 1941 as well as later, our concept of armed uprising as being "yokel-like" and having no chances of success. They reproached us for having "gone into the woods" instead of fighting in the towns.

The concept which was advocated by the others guided the working class toward a frontal clash with the enemy where he was at his strongest, that is to the most difficult conditions and forms of the struggle. Because under the conditions of fascist occupation, the most powerful concentration not merely of armed forces but also of the entire repressive superstructure was concentrated in the towns. This means that workers and other fighters for national liberation would have had to, so to say, fight with bare hands against the immense concentration of the enemy's power. Only a blind man or an adventurer could have hoped that such a strategy of the armed struggle could yield results.

In addition, the defenders of such obsolete concepts of armed uprising forgot that the peasant was actively engaged in the struggle against the occupier and that as such he was an ally on which the revolutionary workers' movement as the initiator of the uprising could rely. That is, on whom the workers' movement could count in determining the military strategy and the tactics of the uprising. It was precisely with this fact that Tito and the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the National Liberation Front reckoned when they decided on partisan war. What was applicable to us was also applicable at that time, to a greater or lesser degree to all occupied European countries.

In the period between the two world wars, and in particular with the emergence of Nazi imperialism, conditions for any kind of armed uprising and in particular for the armed uprising of a socialist nature, had changed considerably as compared with the October Revolution. During the Second World War there was such a concentration of power and of arms and such a superiority of the ruling systems in towns that even the most revolutionary working class, regardless how well organized, was not able to oppose barehanded this power except by methods of illegal political struggle, diversions, sabotage, individual terrorist acts and the like.

Such conditions imposed different tactics and strategy on our armed revolutionary struggle. The enemy could be defeated only by a different strategy and tactics from that which was considered as "classic" by the revolutionary workers' movement. What became necessary, I would say, was to engage the centralized machinery of the occupier in a broad area in which this machinery could no longer operate as it would have operated under the conditions of raising barricades in towns. Such a method of enforced "decentralized" warfare demanded from the enemy to engage large contingents of his military power which he did not always have at his disposal.

Tito and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia understood that what was necessary for the victory of the national liberation struggle was that the forces of this uprising be capable of deconcentrating the power of the enemy and that they clash with parts of this power there where the forces of the uprising could win a victory. Only the concept of partisan war as worked out by Tito corresponded to our conditions. Of course, we also waged in towns all forms of struggle, that is, of war, which were realistically possible. We waged those forms which did not expose the living force of our revolution to the danger of extermination. But, the focal point of our national liberation struggle, in particular in its primary stages, was the partisan war. Of course, the concept of the partisan war would not at all have been possible had it not relied on the concept of the alliance of workers, peasants and the democratic intelligentsia. This concept was possible precisely because, thanks to the policy of the National Liberation Front, the majority of peasants was prepared to fight together with the working class and to support the national liberation uprising. This fact by itself shows best to what extent our military strategy and tactics were dependent on the political one.

3. The Revolutionary Army of the National Liberation Uprising

We did not consider our partisan war only as an assistance to the large armies of our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, as some bad or malicious commentators of the history of our national liberation war are trying to present it. True enough, our partisan war was this, too, but it was also something much more than that. For us the partisan war represented the initial phase of forming a people's revolutionary army of the uprising, an army which would be capable of participating, independently and on equal footing with the armies of our allies, in adopting final decisions of the Second World War in general and as regards the future of Yugoslavia in particular. This was the component of our political strategy. One can say without reservation that in elaborating such a concept of the army Tito's role was of long-term historical significance. Because this concept proved to be successful in practice and this is what is decisive for a historical assessment.

On the basis of the political strategy and tactics of which I have spoken, Tito continually developed the creative initiative for the building up of the entire system of the revolutionary army of the national liberation uprising at an increasingly higher level and in increasingly more developed forms. In this way, our national liberation uprising quickly became more than just a term of a resistance movement, but became a complete system of the revolutionary power of the people who had fought for their existence and for their full victory, by relying on their own increasingly powerful army. As such, the people, with their struggle, continually held a larger or lesser liberated territory and gradually developed their liberation and revolutionary military power, beginning with detachments to brigades, divisions, corps and armies.

Looking at matters in this light we could say that the national liberation uprising and the process of forming its revolutionary army passed through three stages.

The first stage was the setting up of companies and detachments as well as of battalions within the framework of larger detachments and the waging of partisan war actions. With the spread of partisan detachments various forms of their joining with groups of detachments, operation zones and the like emerged. The detachments had both a military and a political function, that is, the function of mobilizing people for the national liberation uprising. Therefore, they were mainly tied down to a certain territory and carried out chiefly classic partisan military actions.

The success of this stage of warfare depended primarily on the attitude of peasants, that is, on whether they would join workers and democratic intelligentsia in setting in train the national liberation war. Thanks to their loyalty to the freedom of their people as well as to the relevant policy of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the National Liberation Front the peasants did just that. A great majority of peasants either

participated directly in the national liberation uprising or supported it in one way or another or objectively facilitated it by their passive resistance. In this way the partisan war became possible and it quickly turned into an all-people uprising. The concept of linking political and military strategy was thus given a convincing confirmation.

However, the uprising could not remain restricted merely to elementary forms of the partisan war and partisan army. To make the uprising truly successful it had to create from the partisan units a striking force which would be capable of dealing increasingly grave blows to the enemy and which would in the ultimate analysis also become capable of destroying the concentrated military force of the enemy. This force would have to be capable of liberating towns and of finally chasing the enemy from the country. This was the kind of perspective which Tito unfolded with his concept of turning partisan detachments first into brigades and later also into major units which would be capable of waging the war in any part of the country and of fighting successfully also with large concentration of enemy forces. This was the second stage of the National Liberation Army and of the uprising itself.

In implementing this strategy I think that Tito's creative thought reached the highest peak. Such a strategy represented the specific characteristic of the Yugoslav national liberation uprising. It also represented at the same time a major contribution to the theory and practice of liberation wars, in particular with reference to the struggle with superior forces. Thanks precisely to this strategy by Tito our national liberation uprising succeeded in forming strike units which were capable of dealing from year to year increasingly heavy blows to the enemy yet remaining at the same time linked with the people's basic masses. In addition to brigades and major units, the partisan detachments, nevertheless, were not abolished. These detachments in liberating the country, also played a major political role. They represented the direct war and political weapons of the national uprising. Partisan detachments dispersed and demoralized enemy forces and represented at the same time a continuous source of capable fighters for brigades and other units of the modern National Liberation Army. This aspect of our military strategy is in the final analysis the result of the political strategy of which I have spoken beforehand.

After the German offensive on Uzice it appeared to some as if we had lost the war while in fact from these battles a new type of the National Liberation Army emerged. Our fighters consciously went into fresh battles. Evidently, this could only happen because they knew what they were fighting for. They knew that they were not fighting for the revival of old Yugoslavia, but for something new, for new relations in society.

I remember when in December 1941, after his retreat from Uzice, Tito held the first review of the newly organized units after the battles at Uzice on Zlata Mountain. The majority of fighters in these units were workers. There were also a considerably large number of peasants, students and

intellectuals in general. They were worn out by battles, which they had just fought. This was a parade in front of the Supreme Headquarters and a very moving event. The fighters were hungry and nearly barefooted. The first snow started to fall. However, as I looked at the faces of those fighters marching in front of us in the snowstorms the tears welled up in my eyes. It is truly a rare happiness for a man to see not merely one, but hundreds upon hundreds of faces every one of which radiated a readiness to lay down his life for a goal of which he is deeply aware.

A bit later, in Rudo, Comrade Tito formed the first proletarian brigade. I had the impression that it was perhaps at the review on Zlatar Mountain that Tito had the idea of forming the proletarian brigades. In any case, regardless whether this impression of mine is accurate or not, the setting up of proletarian brigades turned over a new leaf in the development of our national liberation uprising. Of course, it is not essential that these brigades were called proletarian. This name corresponded to the time and the situation which arose after Uzice when grave hesitation emerged in the ranks of the peasants and of some of our allies in the National Liberation Movement.

In Slovenia, for instance, we did not form proletarian brigades. The reason was primarily that all Slovene brigades consisted mostly or to a considerable extent of workers and [word indistinct] in names would lead to misunderstanding in the National Liberation Movement. In addition, we also bore in mind the role of the Liberation Front in Slovenia which had a broader character than the National Liberation Front in some other parts of Yugoslavia. However, in Slovenia, too, shock brigades and combined units were formed and they were of the same type as the proletarian brigades. As in Serbia, Bosnia and in other parts of Yugoslavia, so in Slovenia the formation of these units played a crucial role in the strengthening of the forces of the national liberation uprising.

The basic characteristic of this second stage in the development of the uprising and of its army was the combination between the classic partisan tactics of warfare with major operations in broader areas and the concentration of national liberation units under the single operative leadership. Thus, the strike force of the National Liberation Army was considerably increased but the army had at the same time retained the ability to maneuver which was characteristic of partisan units. In other words, in this second stage of development of the National Liberation Army, the army became capable of both waging a war with partisan tactics as well as with increasingly frontal offensive and defensive operations with concentrated blows against the enemy.

The third phase in the development of Tito's military strategy and tactics came into being when our war front linked up with the front of the Soviet Army. At that moment, our National Liberation Army was already capable of establishing an independent front against the enemy stretching from Vojvodina to the Adriatic and of chasing him from the country with its

concentrated strength. In the northern section of this front it received significant assistance from the Soviet Army while the victories of the Western allies as well as the arms which we received from them also represented a significant aid, but by far the largest part of the Yugoslav front was maintained by that army. Thus, our National Liberation Army became an equitable part of the allied armies. At the same time it completed the path which led from partisan detachments to a developed army of the modern kind remaining right to the end the weapon of the national liberation war and of the socialist revolution. Thus, the practice confirmed in full the basic course of Tito's military strategy as part of the total political strategy of the national liberation uprising and the socialist revolution.

4. The Historical Significance of the Political and Military Strategy of the National Liberation Uprising and Socialist Revolution in Yugoslavia

The significance of this political and military strategy was fully manifested at the end of the war. The military and political superiority of the National Liberation Movement was so great that the forces of the old political system had no longer any power to threaten the full victory of the socialist revolution.

It was at that time that Tito's farsightedness was again manifested. Bearing in mind the problems which our country would have to face in the struggle for its international recognition as well as the difficulties which could arise in this connection within the framework of the anti-Hitler coalition, Tito and the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia as well as the anti-fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia decided to hold negotiations about the social and political character of new Yugoslavia. They held these negotiations with the reformed Yugoslav government in London, which was supported, of course, by the Western allies. The Tito-Subasic Agreement was an expression of these efforts. This agreement, in fact, contained (?the attitude) which the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the anti-fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia had always advocated, that is, that after the war the people themselves would decide on the form of social, international and political relations and on the question of the monarchy and the Republic.

But, we did not enter this agreement foolishly, at any price and without a long-term concept. We were conscious that this agreement could yield positive results for the peoples of Yugoslavia only if it did not threaten the leading role of the working class in alliance with other working masses. We were prepared to accept certain concessions in order to avoid internal political tensions which could be avoided, in order to [word indistinct] our readiness for a democratic solving of contradictions and in order to facilitate the international recognition of new Yugoslavia. We would accept these concessions only under the condition that key positions in society be retained by those social and political forces which had in fact waged the war, that is, forces which were, together with the Communist Party at its head, associated within the framework of the anti-fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia.

In the course of these negotiations we were exposed to powerful pressure, not merely by Western governments but also by Stalin who demanded from us to allow the return of King Peter. However, it was precisely the strength of the national liberation uprising and of its army, which we had succeeded in developing into a powerful revolutionary force in the course of a few years, which made it possible for us to resist both of those demands and to create our own political concept of the socialist transformation of society.

The victory which we had won testifies to the political and military strategy of our party having been the correct one regardless of temporary hesitations, mistakes or omissions of which there were some during the war. Therefore, all political actions and concrete situations in the course of the national liberation war should be looked at, above all, in the light of these basic strategic directions of our struggle. It was precisely thanks to such a strategy of our national liberation struggle that the switch to revolutionary social changes and the building of our socialist society in the period after the war, that is, to the full spread of the socialist revolution, proceeded chiefly in a peaceful and democratic way. And here too Tito's thought, which led to the Tito-Subasic Agreement, confirmed itself to be correct.

What I would like to add to this is my conviction that this victory also has a major international significance for revolutionary movements. I believe that the military doctrine of our uprising and of our revolution represented truly a completely new approach to the strategy and the tactics of armed uprising. This doctrine confirmed that small nations, too, can fight successfully against a superior enemy if they apply the strategy and the tactics of the struggle which are in line with modern conditions. In addition, the doctrine again proved that the workers' movement cannot count on its victory without the democratic alliance with the peasants, with the progressive intelligentsia and with other strata of the working people.

All in all, we can say that our national liberation war differs qualitatively from all resistance movements in Europe. When I say this, I repeat I do not wish to underrate in any way the enormous contribution made by European peoples with their resistance to the occupier and with their partisan actions to the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition. But both the East and the West are trying so persistently to depict historical facts in the wrong light, for reasons which are not difficult to guess, that I must say this. Our struggle against the occupier was not merely a partisan struggle and not even merely a national liberation war but an all-people's democratic and socialist revolution which succeeded by its own forces. It succeeded, of course, under the general conditions of the successes of the anti-Hitler coalition which also helped us to liberate the country from the occupier and to establish the revolutionary-democratic power of the people led by the working class.

In saying this I certainly do not want to assert that all this is the exclusive subjective merit of the leading forces of the national liberation war and of the socialist revolution. There is no doubt that it was the objectively given circumstances which created the need to operate under new conditions in a new way, that is, these objective circumstances imposed themselves as the best "adviser" as to what should be done. The fact that the Chinese Revolution had also taken a similar road, and after us the armed uprising and national liberation [wars] in Vietnam, Algeria and other Asian and African countries, also shows this convincingly.

It goes without saying that all the forms of revolutionary strategy and tactics cannot be equated. But, one can, therefore, say that the experience of our military strategy and tactics, together with the current experience of other peoples and revolutionary movements, represents a very significant contribution to the experience of the world struggle for the liberation of the oppressed peoples, for social progress and socialism, which has already been made use of and will also be made use of in the future.

But above all, this is an experience for ourselves. With this experience the peoples of Yugoslavia will be capable of defending their independence as well as the freedom of their internal socialist, self-managing and democratic development. And this is the reason why our concept of all-people's defense is based precisely on this.

III. Some One-Sided Approaches in the Historiographic Interpretation of Our Revolution

When speaking of the political and military strategy of our revolution, I have the impression that in a part of our contemporary historiography--even if it is justifiably based on individually written documents, on verifiable events--today's ideological and political concepts of individual historians are based on the past and certain conclusions are drawn which by their essence are not identical with reality. By doing this, such historiographers make a mistake because they fail to analyze the basic long-term social and political trends in Yugoslavia, trends which were a decisive factor in determining the political and military strategy of the Yugoslav Communist Party both before World War II and during our national liberation struggle and socialist revolution. In other words, some of our historians take the objectively given social-historical background in general too little into account and as a result they do not always assess the real substance of the political and military strategy and tactics of the Yugoslav Communist Party correctly from the historical viewpoint or they assess it in a one-sided manner. However, if the strategy and tactics of our party are not considered as a whole and if tactics are not considered as a form of the application of a certain strategy under changed conditions, it is impossible to make a correct assessment of an individual document or event of the national liberation war. As a matter of fact, individual documents or events, taken separately, may give an entirely distorted picture of what has really happened. I would like to illustrate this assertion by a few examples.

In the years immediately following World War I, the Yugoslav Communist Party stood on positions of unitarianism and centralism. However, it later changed its position in a principled way, while recognizing the individual features of the peoples and their right to freedom and equality. Anyhow, although it had assumed such a correct principled position, vacillations in this respect still continued to occur in its ranks in practice.

There are quite a number of such unsolved questions in our contemporary historiography. Also some other decisions and actions of the Yugoslav Communist Party are sometimes interpreted and seen through the prism of one-sided assessments which in a positivist way interpret only the external manifestations of events without linking them with the entire historic development. Therefore, it sometimes appears as if ideology alone had determined certain historic events and not--primarily--vice versa.

Of course, it would be senseless to claim that all decisions and actions of the Yugoslav Communist Party at all periods of its development were unmistakable and positive. However, if we want to assess the real significance and volume of the errors and failures, we must see individual decisions and actions not exclusively ideologically but in their relation to the real social-historic events and in their link with the overall development of the political strategy and tactics of the Yugoslav Communist Party before and during World War II. As a matter of fact, the party most frequently succeeded in realizing and correcting its errors and failures in a relatively short time, thus turning the lessons derived from them into sources of the further development of its concepts.

The proclamation of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party of 22 June 1941 concludes with the following slogans, among others: "Forward in the last and decisive struggle for the freedom and happiness of mankind." "Long live...the Soviet Union!" "Long live...Stalin!" "Long live the Communist International!" This position appears to some people exclusively as a reflection of a narrow class approach in party policy at that time. However, one must not lose sight of the fact that at the time we had to have the main direction (?and orientation) toward winning, involving and mobilizing the workers class and the working strata of the party.

In conformity with the strategic course, Tito and the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party strove to convince the workers class that it must step to the head of the national liberation struggle, because it was only in that way that it could struggle for its own long-term, historical class interests, which is to say, for its own class liberation.

On the other hand, if one followed the logic of a positivist approach to certain documents and facts, one could also accuse the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party of opportunism. This would be the case if somebody, for instance, assessed the Tito-Subasic Agreement as a class alliance with the bourgeoisie. There have been such sectarian criticisms in their time, but life has very quickly shown how unjustified they were. For if one

bears in mind the overall strategy of the Yugoslav Communist Party--that the Yugoslav Communist Party in its orientation during the national liberation war was based on the workers class or rather the alliance of workers, peasants and democratic intelligentsia, that we endeavored to expand this alliance as much as possible and to link it with the elements of patriotically inclined bourgeoisie prepared to accept certain risks in their links with the National Liberation Movement--one cannot speak about any contradiction but rather about two sides of the same process, and the political historical interests and needs of the moment determined which aspects of the policy would be expressed more and which less.

The fact of how one-sided interpretations of historical facts can lead to completely wrong conclusions is best illustrated by an example from the sphere of our military tactics. The attack on Pljevlje at the end of 1941 is justifiably regarded in our country as a military-tactical failure. However, if at the same time it is not said that it was one of the greatest and bravest battles of our national liberation uprising with far-going positive consequences for its development, only half and perhaps even less than half the truth is stated. Among other things, this battle strongly weakened the Italian occupier at a moment when the partisan units led by their supreme staff had to withdraw from Uzice toward Bosnia. The Pljevlje Battle not only essentially facilitated this withdrawal but gave a new upswing to the national liberation uprising which was soon manifested.

2. On Sectarianism and Opportunism [Number 1 not received]

I think that it is in this light that we must also assess certain views expressed in our country in some scientific discussions and in the works of certain of our individual historians. Thus, for example, there are views that our policy at certain moments of the national liberation war was sectarian, that it was in contradiction with the proclaimed policy of the general National Liberation Front and that, therefore, it negatively affected the course of the national liberation war.

Of course, I do not claim that such phenomena and sectarianism did not occur at all. There also was opportunism and vacillation, both before the war and during all its stages. However, not everything was sectarianism or opportunism which today may seem so to someone when on the basis of a contemporary positivist or other ideological interpretation he analyzes individual documents or historical facts. It is clear that at that time our party's task was not only to adopt a strategic concept but also to apply an appropriate everyday political tactic which was able to continuously insure that power relationship relative to the political forces in the country which insured the practical implementation of the party's strategy.

Therefore, the party had to take into account all ideological, social, class and political processes in the National Liberation Movement and in society in general.

It is also clear that in these directives the party leadership also had to point out the international aspects of our struggle. The most reactionary circles of the Western coalition stubbornly supported the Chetniks until 1943, and some of them even later, as the military and political factor that would at any price--even tolerating their collaboration with the occupiers--be prepared as the potential force for the settlement with "communism," which is to say with the forces which composed the National Liberation Front and were the political support and the champions of the national liberation war. We could not close our eyes to this fact, but had to point out to the communists and all the fighters in the National Liberation Movement the dangers of undermining the strength and the power of the National Liberation Movement from within by these forces.

However, it is precisely these internal directives of various consultations, conferences and sessions of the party leadership that are most frequently cited as evidence of sectarianism. True, there was sectarianism: Not even the party leadership was quite free of this disease. But in essence and taken as a whole, these party activities did not represent any sectarianism but a duty imposed by the very logic of the struggle. We would not have been revolutionaries-realists had we not had constantly in mind the fact that the fate of the uprising depended primarily on whether we would be able to create and to maintain that a relationship of forces within the National Liberation Movement and in society in general which would insure that the leading role in new Yugoslavia would be played by those forces which actually led the national liberation uprising and war.

I have the impression that certain opportunistic positions with which the communists had to clash even during the national liberation war are manifested behind these interpretations of alleged sectarianism or dogmatism of the Yugoslav Communist Party policy, unless, of course, it is not a matter of fortuitous scientific research failures. Had we not wanted to clash with the forces of the Yugoslav Government-in-exile, including the Chetniks, we not only would have had to renounce the national liberation uprising but would also have had to sign an act of suicide for the forces which carried on the National Liberation Movement. Therefore, we had to clash with opportunism both in the National Liberation Movement and in society in general. Practice itself quickly denied this opportunism, because in some cases a naive or nonvigilant attitude--an attitude toward the influence of a truly extant class and political conflict not dependent on us which exerted itself upon the development of the national liberation war--led to serious and bloody consequences for the National Liberation Movement.

After all, Stalin himself "pushed" us to such an opportunistic course. He persistently kept proposing to us that we compromise with Draza Mihailovic, with the leaders of old Yugoslavia and above all with the Yugoslav Government-in-exile in London. This was the case even in the later years of the war when the Chetniks had obviously imposed a life-or-death struggle on the National Liberation Movement. Even in November 1944 when I attended talks with Stalin, he demanded that we allow King Peter to return to the country and that we make sweeping concessions to the political leaders of old Yugoslavia, which we really could not make. In reply to Stalin's insistence that we allow King Peter to return to Yugoslavia, I said that this was absolutely impossible because our people would never understand.

Stalin first criticized us for allegedly being sectarians--although he did not use this word--and then he repeated his advice that we should nevertheless admit the king, since we were sufficiently strong to be able to chase him out when the time was right. Of course, I relied that such tactics were unacceptable to the consciousness of our peoples and that we would lose a tremendous amount of confidence from our people by doing so. Stalin exerted the same pressure on us earlier, when Tito met with him.

Of course, in all this Stalin had in mind the specific interests of the Soviet Union at that time. These interests consisted of his desire to maintain cooperation with the Western powers, on which the strength of the anti-Hitlerite coalition depended. After all, we can understand to a certain degree why Stalin thought and worked like this as part of his global policy. But we did not want to become small change in his global policy as much as we did not want to renounce the prospect of creating a new Yugoslavia for the sake of which broad people's masses fought both against the occupiers and their allies. In brief, Stalin had in mind the unity of the anti-Hitlerite coalition, and we the unity of the National Liberation Movement. The very fact that we resisted Stalin resulted in more positive views in the West toward our National Liberation Movement, for the Western allies began to understand that they could not talk about us through Stalin, but only with us directly.

Let us also take, by way of example, the beginning of the creation of national liberation committees. There are some tendencies which now strive to show that with the transition of the committees for aid to the National Liberation Army to the national liberation committees we conducted a sectarian policy, introduced class elements and agitated against the bourgeoisie and rich peasants, which is to say that we conducted a narrow class policy.

Admittedly, when it was a matter of Quisling political and military formations, we adopted a sharper attitude toward their leading cadres--who were mostly recruited either from the ruling political and military structure of old Yugoslavia or from the ranks of village bosses--than toward misled peasants and other members of these formations. But that was war and the differences in our approach were primarily designed to turn the vacillating people in that structure away from an engagement on the side of the enemies. Therefore, it makes no sense to see in this some sort of an ideological orientation toward a "class war," although the national liberation war, for aforementioned reasons, objectively contained elements of a class war. But it was not us but history that invented this.

We had to struggle for a change in the nature of authority in the liberated territory. We had to struggle for the participation of the basic strata of the people in the uprising and in the new people's authority. Therefore, we stressed their essential social and political interests. Similarly, we had to bear in mind that certain contradictions existed between the

Soviet Union and the Western allies which would also be reflected in the development of the activities of either side within Yugoslavia. Likewise, we had to warn that the reactionary forces, having their political positions in a certain class structure, would in the long run persistently try with various forms of action to undermine and destroy the strength of the National Liberation Movement, which opened the prospect for the broad people's masses to create a new, people's and democratic Yugoslavia.

Of course, when the assessment is made as to what is opportunistic and what is not, one should proceed from an objective (?appraisal) of a given document and actual events, which is to say objective historical events. Unless we bear this in mind, we could say that every struggle to democratically expand the National Liberation Movement was opportunism, which some sectarian people actually did during the war, and some people even now assess the events of that time from such ideological positions. Among the party members there were some people of a more or less sectarian disposition who saw opportunism in every struggle for the widest possible expansion of the mass basis of the National Liberation Front.

However, in this struggle to expand the National Liberation Movement risky undertakings had sometimes to be made. After all, what was more risky than Tito going to the talks with Draza Mihailovic at the latter's headquarters. Furthermore, there was the matter of a political struggle to gain influence over the peasants who at certain moments vacillated very much.

In addition, the Yugoslav Communist Party knew even how to correct mistakes quickly. Looking at the past from this angle, I think I shall not exaggerate if I say that a great deal of what was at one time in some places called opportunism and what some people even now assess as opportunism represented a justified struggle to expand the National Liberation Movement, which did not always end in success.

Let us look, for example, at a critical assessment of the provincial conference of the Yugoslav Communist Party for Bosnia and Hercegovina in Ivancici near Sarajevo at the beginning of January 1942.

As Marxists we were aware that class interests and conflicts also were at work during the time of the national liberation war. As I have said, we did not want to conduct a class war nor did we make class demands to an extent greater than necessary for the mobilization of the workers class and other people's masses in the uprising. However, the objective social contradictions were at work whether we wanted it or not, for the national liberation uprising of armed masses of the people decided not only the issue of the freedom and independence of the peoples of Yugoslavia, but also the strength of the social influence of the masses that carried it on to create the future new Yugoslavia. The reactionary forces of old Yugoslavia with the support of some Western governments wanted to prevent precisely this influence.

On the other hand, we were revolutionaries and not petit bourgeois politicians. We could not call on the masses to shed their blood in the national liberation uprising only so that after the defeat of the occupiers old Yugoslavia would be restored as a prison for the people. We had to hold up before the fighting people's masses the prospect for decisionmaking in new Yugoslavia. And of course, in such a situation we had to warn the communists in particular of the class contradictions and the influence they could have for the development of the national liberation uprising. It was only in this sense that we spoke also about the role of the reactionary bourgeois elements in the villages on whom the collaborators with the occupiers and the forces of the Yugoslav Government-in-exile in London leaned for support.

And precisely this type of political action by the Ivancici Conference is proclaimed sectarianism and advocacy of class war in certain critical assessments.

In that situation we had only the following alternative left: Either to capitulate or to reconcile ourselves with the necessity to conduct a struggle with the enemies who stabbed the national liberation uprising in the back. Of course, we chose the struggle. But even in this situation we did not want simply to accept the challenge of the Chetniks and the Yugoslav Government-in-exile in London. We said that we would fight against those who collaborated with the occupiers and would respond to every armed strike against the National Liberation Army, but that we would continue to strive for the implementation of the national liberation front platform, which is to say that the struggle against the occupiers remained our first and main task and that the internal reactionary forces were our enemies because and when they collaborated with the occupiers.

It is true that a group of communists, mainly from Hercegovina, who advocated sectarian positions was present at the Ivancici Conference. However, their positions were criticized and rejected at the conference and they had no influence on the conclusions and not even on the course of the discussion which otherwise was very unanimous.

This shows how unjustified are the assertions that the Ivancici Conference incited sectarianism in Hercegovina and some other parts of the country. Precisely the reverse happened: The conference more or less ended this sectarian practice which had been manifested before the conference and which some sought to have confirmed at the conference. However, the conference not only did not confirm this practice but imposed the obligation on the party cadres to abandon it.

Naturally, this conference rejected with an equal determination certain opportunist positions which, in the final analysis, had their origin in the illusion that a (?conflict) with the forces of the Yugoslav Government-in-exile could be avoided if greater concessions were made to them. However, the documents, or rather the facts which have now become

available to all clearly indicate that what was involved was a single aim of the reactionary forces--the annihilation of the national liberation uprising as a "communist uprising." For this reason the political forces of old Yugoslavia rejected every agreement which we had been constantly offering to them. The persistence of our offers to these forces is also confirmed by the fact that at the beginning of 1942, that is after the clash with Draza Mihailovic, Tito decided that detachments of volunteers could be formed as a part of the National Liberation Army, detachments which did not need to wear the emblem of the National Liberation Army (a five-pointed star, sickle and hammer), but whose members were ready to fight against the occupier.

Had Draza Mihailovic and the Yugoslav Government-in-exile in London accepted Tito's proposals for cooperation during his meetings with Draza Mihailovic, as well as Tito's later initiatives, it is certain that the course of the National Liberation Movement would in some of its aspects been different. Had they decided in favor of this cooperation, the leading forces of the Yugoslav Government-in-exile would also have had to decide in favor of great concessions to the demands of the national masses regarding the solving of the national question, democracy, the social system and so forth, something that these forces were not ready to do. For this reason these forces decided in favor of cooperation with the occupier and for an annihilation of the National Liberation Movement. Accordingly, we were not the ones who imposed a class war, but rather the shortsighted policy of the Yugoslav Government-in-exile in London and the ruling leaders of old Yugoslavia, a policy which was based on giving advantage to their class and hegemonistic interests over the national interests of the broad national masses.

Of course, the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party was aware of the class background of this policy of the Yugoslav Government-in-exile in London. Despite the national and other political differences among the forces which were behind the Yugoslav Government-in-exile in London and despite certain differences in their tactics in the country, this policy was essentially unified. In fact, both the Chetniks who cooperated with the occupier, as well as certain circles of the Croatian Peasant Party which cooperated with the Ustashas, the Moslem circles which cooperated with the Chetniks and Ustashas, the Slovene clericals and other reactionary leaders who cooperated with the occupier and the Chetniks, as well as all other political groups which opposed the national liberation uprising had the same aim: To annihilate, with pen or concealed cooperation with the occupier, the national liberation uprising and thus to create the conditions for a renewal of the old social system. All of them wanted to attain this goal, regardless of the fact that certain national parts of these political circles held different views on the future political--particularly between the nations--form of the social system.

In this connection a rather stupid obstinacy in rejecting any negotiations, or rather agreement, with the leadership of the National Liberation Movement was characteristic for the Yugoslav Government-in-exile and for its military and political representatives in the country. Even when the Western

governments began officially to cooperate with the Supreme Headquarters of the National Liberation Army and the partisan detachments of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav Government-in-exile in London refused to do this. Only when it lost every chance, when it lost both "its army" and any serious influence among the people, did Subasic become the leader of this government--more by the will of the Western governments than by the will of the political leaders of old Yugoslavia--"to salvage what could be salvaged." However, nothing could any longer be salvaged from the old system.

This was the objective social-historical "background" of the political developments during the national liberation uprising and war. The leadership of the national liberation uprising could not have been called the leadership had it not been capable of perceiving this social-historical and class "background" and, on the basis of a constant analysis of this background, of drawing the necessary conclusion for political and military action, that is, for the entire military and political strategy and tactics of the national liberation war.

Naturally, since at that time the main goal of the military and political offensive of the occupier and its domestic allies of all colors--that is, domestic traitors--was the annihilation of the [word indistinct] of the Yugoslav Communist Party, the conference in Ivancici particularly stressed the tasks of the closest possible links between the Yugoslav Communist Party and the broad people's masses which began the uprising. Without the party carrying out this role, the uprising could not survive. Accordingly, what was involved here is not "an ideological narrowness" or "a sectarian attitude," but rather a need which was imposed by the very logic of the struggle at that moment.

I have pointed to some unsolved problems of our history because the success of our national liberation uprising and socialist revolution can not be explained unless one grasps precisely the long-term political and military strategy of the Yugoslav Communist Party--which was outlined under Tito's creative leadership--and its varied application in the daily political struggles and actions, which again must be viewed as an entity regarding the basic strategic direction, and not separately. And this is what sustained our entire National Liberation Movement and the socialist revolution and led to their victory.

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